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The dissertation offers an analysis of the role of budgetary institutions on the
determination of fiscal outcomes. In the second chapter I provide a theoretical model
that rationalizes differences in fiscal outcomes of two countries that are supposed
to obey the same set of numerical constraints on the budget. I argue that these
differences arise from heterogeneity in the degree of budgetary transparency that
make these rules more or less binding. Moreover, the model is able to accommo-
date not only long run results, where stronger institutions will always cause more
constrained fiscal outcomes, but also short run implications, where countries with
relatively stronger institutions can be paired with relatively unconstrained outcomes.
The main lesson of the chapter is that, in a democratic environment, transparency of
the budgetary process is the main ingredient responsible for the good behavior of the
government, and that numeric constraints will have very different effects depending
on the level of transparency.
In the third chapter I conduct an empirical investigation across a set of coun-
tries, of the effects of budgetary institutions on fiscal outcomes. I exploit a new
dataset on budgetary practices across countries, to construct several measures of
the three recognized budgetary institutions: numerical rules, procedural rules, and
budgetary transparency. The main finding of the chapter is that among budgetary
institutions, transparency is the only one that is consistently associated with more
fiscal discipline, a finding that goes in hand with the results of the model in the
previous chapter.
The fourth chapter provides an empirical investigation of the effects of bud-
getary transparency on fiscal outcomes in the American States. I construct a trans-
parency measure across time from the mid 1980s that allows me, not only to look at
the evolution of transparency in the American States, but to take account of possible
fixed effects in the estimations. My results essentially corroborate those obtained
elsewhere in the literature, that greater fiscal transparency among the American
States is associated with larger size of government, but I show that this effect is less
robust and economically relevant than previously thought.
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In this dissertation I examine the role of budgetary institutions on the de-
termination of fiscal outcomes. Budgetary institutions are defined as the set of all
the rules and regulations according to which budgets are prepared, approved and
carried out (Alesina and Perotti (1999)). These institutions have generally been
divided into three different categories. The first are rules that impose numerical
constraints on the deficit. The second are procedural rules that dictate the timing
and mechanisms by which the budget is drafted within the executive and approved
by the legislature. The third and final category, is the degree of transparency of the
budgetary process. Each one of the next three chapters is a self-contained essay that
explores different aspects of budgetary institutions. They have in common, though,
one of these institutions: the transparency of the budgetary process.
The purpose of Chapter 2 is to explain how is it possible that two different
countries that are supposed to obey the same set of numerical constraints on the
budget, like the members of the European Union subject to the Maastrich Treaty,
can have such dissimilar fiscal outcomes. I argue that differences in outcomes arise
from heterogeneity in the degree of budgetary transparency that make these rules
more or less binding. Moreover, it is postulated that budgetary transparency is the
key ingredient in shaping fiscal outcomes. To this end, I provide a career concern
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model in which the government is in an agency relationship with their constituents
and might enjoy some information advantages, depending on the degree of trans-
parency of the budgetary process. The results of the model show how transparency
is enough to generate differences in fiscal outcomes while numeric budgetary rules
are effective only if the budgeting process is transparent enough.
When compared with other models that look at similar issues, the novel char-
acteristics of the model presented here are twofold: First, from a technical point
of view, the model’s dynamic structure arises from first principles. This structure
allows the study of policy decisions over long periods of time. Second, from a con-
ceptual point of view, the model shows that lack of transparency is a sufficient
condition for generating undesirable levels of debt and deficits.
The main lesson of the chapter is that, in a democratic environment, trans-
parency of the budgetary process is the main ingredient responsible for the good
behavior of the government, and that numeric constraints will have very different
effects depending on the level of transparency.
In Chapter 3, I pursue an empirical investigation across a set of countries, of the
effects of budgetary institutions on fiscal outcomes. Following the common strategy
in the literature, I exploit a new dataset on budgetary practices across countries, to
construct several measures of the three recognized budgetary institutions: numerical
rules, procedural rules, and budgetary transparency. I then perform a battery of
econometric tests to asses the relative importance of these institutions, proxy by the
constructed measures, on several fiscal outcomes. The first finding of the chapter is
that among budgetary institutions, transparency is the only one that is consistently
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associated with more fiscal discipline, a finding that goes in hand with the results
of the model in the previous chapter. However, the hypothesized conditional effect
of numerical rules becoming more binding as transparency increases, from Chapter
2, fails to show up for the sample of countries analyzed in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 is also an empirical assessment of budgetary institutions but differs
in several aspects from Chapter 3. First, I concentrate only on the implications
of budgetary transparency on fiscal outcomes. Second, the object of study is the
American States instead of a set of countries, which eliminates one source of het-
erogeneity. Finally, I am able to construct a transparency measure across time from
the mid 1980s that allows me, not only to look at the evolution of transparency in
the American States, but to take account of possible fixed effects in the estimations.
My results essentially corroborate those obtained elsewhere in the literature (Alt,
Lassen and Skilling (2003)), that greater fiscal transparency among the American
States is associated with larger size of government, but I show that this effect is less
robust and economically relevant than previously thought.
Finally, Chapter 5 provide the conclusions.
3
Chapter 2
Transparency and Numeric Rules in the Budgeting Process and the
Provision of Public Goods in an Agency Model
2.1 Introduction
“Elected officials typically enjoy an immense informational advantage over the
voters that limits how accountable such agents will be to the voters desires. This is
a consequence of the complexity of modern government.” (Ferejohn 1999).
What is the role of budgetary institutions in shaping the size of the budget and,
ultimately, the delivery of public goods? How independent are these institutions
from one each other and which ones, if any, are truly necessary and/or sufficient
to affect fiscal outcomes? This paper explains how two different countries that are
supposed to obey the same set of rules, like the members of the European Union and
the Maastrich Treaty, can have such dissimilar fiscal outcomes. In other words, it
will provide an explanation of how and when these rules will be an active constraint
on the government.
In this chapter, I provide a career concern model in which the government is
in an agency relationship with their constituents and might enjoy some information
advantages, depending on the degree of transparency of the budgetary process. The
results of the model show how transparency is enough to generate differences in
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fiscal outcomes while numeric budgetary rules are effective only if the budgeting
process is transparent enough. This model was inspired by two well known pieces in
the political economy literature: the political business cycle model with prospective
voting (Rogoff and Siebert (1988), Rogoff (1990), Shi and Svensson (2001)), and the
elections as a disciplining device model with retrospective voting (Ferejohn (1986)).
To the best of my knowledge, no other work –besides Milesi-Ferretti (2004)–
provides a theoretical framework for the relationship between transparency and
numeric constraints on the budgeting process and their implications over deficits or
other fiscal variables. Although I contrast in full the work of Milesi-Ferreti in the
next section, it bears noting that the novel characteristics of the model presented
here are twofold: First, from a technical point of view, the model’s dynamic structure
arises from first principles. This structure allows the study of policy decisions over
long periods of time. Second, from a conceptual point of view, the model shows
that lack of transparency is a sufficient condition for generating undesirable levels
of debt and deficits.
The main lesson of the chapter is that, in a democratic environment, trans-
parency of the budgetary process is the main ingredient responsible for the good
behavior of the government, and that numeric constraints will have very different
effects depending on the level of transparency.
The policy recommendation of the chapter is that citizens of democracies
should, in their own best interest, push for a more transparent budgetary process
and dedicate less effort towards controlling the government by imposing numeric
constraints such as maximum deficit rules. Supranational organizations could play
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a decisive role in this task.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In section 2 I review the
literature and contrast it with the proposed model. In section 3 I present the
model and the political economy equilibrium is derived in section 4. The concluding
remarks are presented in section 5.
2.2 Literature Review
Shi and Svenson (2001) propose a moral hazard model of electoral competition
to explain a set of empirical findings about the size of electoral budget cycles, and
conclude that these depend on the rents of those remaining in power and the share
of informed voters. Alt and Lassen (2003) slightly modify the Shi and Svenson
model and reinterpret the share of informed voters as transparency in the budgeting
process, and conclude that lower transparency produces higher levels of debt and
larger deficits. The problem with their model is that in the absence of electoral
cycles (i.e., if there were no elections or if elections occurred in every period), no
debt or deficit could be generated. In other words, the Alt and Lassen model
predicts that transparency affects fiscal outcomes only in the electoral year. In
contrast, the model presented here builds on some of the structure of the Shi and
Svenson model, but eliminates the political fiscal cycle motive by allowing elections
to occur in every period. In spite of this removal, the current model still generates an
inverse relationship between transparency and debt. This is relevant not only from a
conceptual perspective, but also because the majority of empirical tests (Alesina et
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al (1998), Alt and Lassen (2003) themselves) analyze the cross-sectional implications
of transparency in fiscal outcomes and none of them show evidence that an election
dummy is significant. Shi and Svenson do test their dynamic model with a good
proxy for the share of informed voters (number of radios per head) but that could
hardly be considered a good proxy for budgetary transparency.
In a seminal paper, Ferejohn (1986), obtained optimal reelection rules when
the incumbent’s actions can not be directly observed by retrospectively inferring
these actions based on realized outcomes. This pure outcome evaluation can be
interpreted in the context of the model presented here as a case of full opacity, where
the signal drawn by the electorate is simply uninformative. Persson, Roland and
Tabellini (1997) (PR&T), in a similar setup, also derive the case of full information,
where voters can observe incumbent’s actions, and show that even in this case
the incumbent will extract rents from being in power. In terms of the present
model this could be associated with a case of full transparency where the signal
drawn from the private sector perfectly identifies the current shock. Whereas the
structure for obtaining the optimal reelection rule is similar to these two previous
works, there are several differences that are worth mentioning. Here I explicitly
use two goods, private and public, from which voters derive utility, allowing me
to trace real world policy decisions. Further, the state of the world is not only
determined by an exogenous shock, but also by the history of policy decisions made
by the incumbent. This feature allows situations where the incumbent will optimally
choose to perform actions that are costly only to him and be reelected, even under
the most adverse of shock realizations, provided he has enough fiscal resources, i.e.
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that issuing new debt is not too costly. In this regard, a final difference between this
model and those mentioned previously lies in the fact I analyzed different degrees
of informational asymmetry, and their relation to fiscal outcomes in addition to
welfare. Unfortunately, the complexity of the model does not allow for a closed
form solution, unlike the previously mentioned works.
The work that is most closely related to the model presented here is Milesi-
Ferretti (2004) which is the first, and to the best of my knowledge, the only paper
that looks at the effects of budgetary rules and budgetary transparency simultane-
ously on fiscal outcomes. In a two-period model, with heterogenous policymakers
that seek to minimize an arbitrary loss function, Milesi-Ferretti show that the extent
to which a myopic ruler will engage in creative accounting (defined as deviations
from a preestablished budgetary rule) depends negatively on the transparency of the
budgetary process. A fundamental difference between the two models, in addition
to the dynamics, is that in Milesi-Ferretti transparency is a necessary condition for
sound fiscal policy whereas in my model transparency is not only necessary but also
sufficient.
2.3 The Model
I consider an economy populated by a continuum of mass one of identical and
infinitely lived individuals called voters. At every moment in time an incumbent,
picked randomly from within the economy, is in charge of the government and will
remain in power until he is voted out and replaced by an identical agent, who was a
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voter at the end of the last period, and who now becomes the new incumbent. The
former incumbent returns to the population as a voter, and while nothing forbids
him from being elected again, the probability of this event happening is equal to
zero. The assumption that the voted out politician rejoins the general population
is a key element for the solution of the model; I explain this in detail later in the
chapter.
Each voter obtains utility from two types of goods: a privately endowed good
and a public good produced by the incumbent. The total period utility for voters,
U vt , is aggregated as follows:
U vt = g̃t + u(ct), (2.1)
where g̃ represents per capita amounts of the public good and c denotes private
consumption. Each period, voters receive an exogenous and constant amount of
income, y, and pay the sum of taxes demanded by the incumbent, τt. Private
consumption takes place residually, according to the individual budget constraint:
ct = y − τt. It is assumed that the sub-utility of the private good, u, is twice
continuously differentiable and strictly concave. What is important to note about
equation (2.1) is that voters know exactly how much of the public and private goods
they are consuming in each period.
The incumbent’s period utility function is identical to that of voters, since the
incumbent rose from within the population, but incorporates costs and benefits of
being in office:
U It = g̃t + u(ct) + χ− φ(et), (2.2)
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where χ represents ego rents from being in office, charged every period t, and φ is the
disutility function of the effort variable, et, which is the amount of effort measured
in dollars that the incumbent devotes to public good production in the present
period, and that is unobserved by voters. I assume that φ is twice continuously
differentiable and strictly convex, representing the idea that the extra unit of effort
is ever costlier. Both the incumbent and voters are assumed to be expected utility
maximizers.
The production of the public good is described by the following equation:
g̃t = θt[τt + dt + et]−D(dt−1), (2.3)
where dt is the per period government new debt maturing in the following period, and
D(dt−1) is the amount of debt plus interest payments maturing this period. Whereas
τ , d and e are choice variables for the government, θt represents an exogenous
shock to the production of public goods. It can be thought of as an input shock
summarizing the cost and composition of raw materials in the production of public
goods. I assume that the set of possible values that θ can take is continuous,
compact, time invariant, and common knowledge for voters and incumbent alike:
everyone knows that θt ∈ [θ, θ]. I further assume that θ is identically independent
distributed (iid) over the mentioned set with E(θ) = 1. I will give some intuitive
examples of θ later in the chapter when I introduce the notion of transparency.
With respect to the cost of public debt, I follow the same assumptions as Shi
and Svensson (2001) or Alt and Lassen (2003), where D(d) is defined as a convex
borrowing function. In particular, D(0) = 0, D′(0) = 1, and D′′(d) > 0 for all d > 0.
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The convexity of D means that the marginal cost of borrowing is increasing in the
amount of the principal, which can be linked to the country risk premium.
2.3.1 Transparency in the Budgeting Process
Transparency of the budgetary process is understood along the lines of Kopits
and Craig (1998), who define transparency as openness towards the public at large
about government structure and functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector
accounts, and projections. Transparency involves ready access to reliable, com-
prehensive, timely, understandable, and internationally comparable information on
government activities, so that the electorate and financial markets can accurately as-
sess the government’s financial position and the true cost and benefits of government
activities, including their present and future economic and social implications1.
Here, I condense this notion of transparency in the budgeting process as the
ability of voters to observe the true costs and composition of inputs involved in the
production of the public good. That is, the potential to assess the true value of θ.
In this respect, I assume that only the incumbent can directly observe θ. On the
other hand, voters obtain an estimate2, θ̃, of the true value of the shock, conditional
on the degree of transparency and the actual realization of θ. The government will
always have incentives to understate θ in order to make voters think that effort was
higher.
Some real world examples that help us understand this mechanism would be:
1The definition is almost verbatim and was originally taken from Alt and Lassen (2003).
2Also called signal throughout the chapter.
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• Price of cement, steel, aluminum, etc: Voters can see new infrastructure but
they can’t know for sure what materials were used to build it. More impor-
tantly, without periodical revisions of the expending accounts, expenses at the
end of the year can be justified claiming the material was purchased at the
peak of the price within the year.
• The (audited) report of energy sources: if oil prices decline the government
can argue that it had previously engaged in unfavorable futures contracts. If
the price rises, it can argue it didn’t have those contracts to hedge.
• Detail over contractors (suppliers): if payments to contractors are fully aggre-
gated (Low Transparency), then it is easy to overstate costs. If on the contrary
they are more disaggregated, this possibility is reduced.
To incorporate this idea in the model, I consider the degree of transparency of
the budgetary process to be inversely related to a measure ε ∈ [0, ε], that is, more
transparent regimes are associated with a lower value of ε. I treat ε as a parameter
that is both exogenous and known to the incumbent and voters alike. The reason
for this is that I am interested in the effect of transparency over fiscal outcomes
rather than on the dynamic properties of transparency itself which, although a very
interesting question, goes beyond the scope of this work. I then assume voters will
draw a θ̃ that depends on the given exogenous value of ε, the unobserved realization
of θ, and its distribution f(θ). I treat θ̃ as a continuous uniform random variable
that can take any value over the moving interval [max(θ, θt − ε), min(θ, θt + ε)].
The inference process about the true value of the shock is informative if it
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helps to further bound the set of possible θ. Depending on the level of transparency
there are four possible information regions:
1. Full Transparency (ε = 0): in this case θ̃ = θ. This is the most informative
case.
2. High Transparency (ε ≤ θ−θ
2
): in this case the inference process is always
informative in the sense that the signal will give a range of the true value of
the shock that is fully contained in [θ, θ] or θ̃ ⇒ θ ∈ [max(θ̃−ε, θ), min(θ̃+ε, θ)].
3. Low Transparency ( θ−θ
2
< ε < θ − θ): in this range, depending on the real-
ization of θ̃, voters will or will not be able to get more accurate information
about θ.
4. Null Transparency (ε > θ− θ): a case in which the inference process is simply
not informative.
Given the voter’s inference process, the conditional expectation of θ on the





2.4 The Political Economy Equilibrium
This section describes the agency game in which voters (the principal) and
incumbent (the agent) engage to maximize their respective expected utilities.
The game is characterized by a succession of identical periods. A period starts
with an incumbent in office who observes θ and θ̃. Meanwhile, voters can only
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observe θ̃. Next, the incumbent decides fiscal policy: τt, dt and et. He repays
principal and interests of outstanding debt, D(dt−1), and produces the public good,
g̃t. Voters (and the incumbent), after paying τt, consume both types of goods,
ct and g̃t. The period ends with the revelation of dt−1 and an election in which
voters reappoint the incumbent only if the total utility they got in the period was
high enough. Otherwise, a new government is put in place, the defeated politician
returns to the population as a voter, and the game proceeds to the next period.
Figure 2.1: Timing of the Game.
Given that there are no decisions involved in the production of the private
good and that the private sector is not allowed to save, the only decision that voters
face is how much to demand from the incumbent in each period, in other words,
what is the reelection rule (See Ferejohn (1986) for a classical example).3 On the
agent side, the incumbent chooses fiscal policy, subject to the government budget
constraint and to the reelection rule. In other words, every period the incumbent
selects optimal policy under reelection and under expropriation. Expropriation is
defined as a situation in which the incumbent, optimally exerts the minimum level of
effort given that he will not be reappointed next period. To select the optimal policy,
3It is assumed that voters agree on the reelection rule, i.e. I ignore any coordination problem.
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the incumbent must take into account the endogenous probability of reelection, and
then picks the one that yields the highest lifetime expected discounted utility. One
can immediately see the tension introduced by the reelection rule: in the long term,
higher reelection rules (the ones that demand higher utility levels) necessarily imply
higher levels of effort.4 As I show later in the chapter, higher levels of effort will
imply a non-decreasing probability of expropriation, and thus, when expropriation
occurs, lower levels of the public good. On the other hand, lower reelection rules
will perpetuate incumbents that put in little effort and thus deliver low levels of
utility.














which in turn is subject to
ct = y − τt,
g̃t = θt[τt + dt + et] + D(dt−1),




t ≥ Ū) + (1− p)(U vt < Ū)], and p
the probability that the incumbent will choose to fulfill the reelection rule.
4The incumbent can use more debt to finance higher levels of public good, but only in the short
run since perpetual roll over will violate a No Ponzi Game condition.
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In order to obtain the solution to (2.5), I start by finding the solution to




t+1 as the incumbent’s expected present
discounted value of being in office next period, which can be decomposed into his
utility at t of providing Ū , and the continuation value of holding office. In the same




t+1 as the incumbent’s expected present discounted
value of being out of office next period, which is decomposed into his utility at t of
reneging Ū , and the continuation value of returning to the population as a voter.
Suppose voters have instituted the reelection rule ˆ̄U . Then, upon the realization
of θ and θ̃, the incumbent at time t will choose to deliver (at least) ˆ̄U only if it is
incentive compatible, that is, only if:
U It + βEtV
I
t+1 ≥ U ot + βEtV vt+1 (2.7)
The solution to (2.7) is not trivial: first, although it is clear that p affects V It+1,
equation (2.7) shows that due to the return of the incumbent to the voter pool, p
also affects V vt+1. Second, it is easy to see that V
v
t+1 is the solution to (2.5) at the
optimum Ū∗, for which (2.5) and (2.6) must be jointly solved.
In the remainder of this section the model is solved for three particular cases.
First, I consider the dictatorship, a political economy environment in which voters
have no power to dethrone the incumbent and so, regardless on the transparency
level, Ū plays no role. The dictatorship is not only the easiest case to solve, but a
necessary first step in the solution of any democratic case: it provides us with U ot in
(2.7). I then proceed to solve the polar cases of full transparency (ε = 0), and full
opacity (ε > θ − θ).
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2.4.1 No Elections: The Dictatorship
Assume a dictator is in power during period t and that, after observing the
amount of debt outstanding from period t − 1 and the contemporaneous shock,
decides his policy action for period t in order to maximize the present discounted
value of his utility, knowing that he will remain in power forever. In other words,






βt−1[g̃t + u(ct) + χ− φ(et)], (2.8)
subject to
ct = y − τt
g̃t = θt[τt + dt + et] + D(dt−1)
from which one can write the dynamic programming version of the problem
as:
V ot (dt−1, θt) = max{g̃t + u(ct) + χ− φ(et) + βEtV ot+1(dt, θt+1)} (2.9)
subject to the individual and governmental budget constraints.
The first order conditions to this problem are:





θt − φ′(et) = 0 (2.12)
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where the envelope condition is
∂V ot
∂dt−1
= −D′(dt−1). After updating, one get the







The first establishes that the private good is negatively correlated with the contem-
poraneous shock or, alternatively, that it is more convenient to finance the public
good, by means of higher taxes, when inputs are relatively cheaper (θ is high). The
second shows, by the same reasoning, that it will be optimal to incur higher debt to
produce the public good when it is relatively cheap to do so; however, note that for
β sufficiently high, there would be states for which debt will be zero. Also note that,
given the assumption that θ is iid, optimal decision is not history dependant. The
last optimality condition also exhibits a positive relationship between public good
productivity and effort; whether effort would be positive or the condition would
be always binding depends on φ and θ. I assume that no incumbent, whether dic-
tator or not, will voluntarily exert any effort by imposing the following No-Effort
Condition: θ ≤ φ′(0).
2.4.1.1 Dictatorship Simulation
In order to perform comparisons of policy, fiscal outcomes and welfare across
different degrees of transparency (and political organization) I simulate the proposed
model, starting with a dictatorship but assuming the same functional forms and
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parameters for all scenarios. Table 2.1 presents the specific functional forms and
parameters. Given the simplicity of functional forms, tax policy turns out to be
independent of the level of transparency. Instead of choosing a different functional
form, I have assumed that taxes had to be decided before θ and θ̃ are revealed which
makes u′(ct) = E(θt) = 1 for all t 5. The solution is obtained by iterating over the
value function until convergence is reached.
Table 2.1: Parameters and functional forms
parameters functional forms
y = 4 u(c) = ln(c)
β = .95 φ(e) = exp(1.2e)− 1
χ = 3 D(d ≥ 0) = d + d2
θt ∈ [0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.1, 1.2]
Figure 2.2 presents the dictator policy responses for 60 periods of the simulated
model. I have transformed the continuous variable θ into a discrete one that can
take any of five possible values with the same probability. The figure reflects the two
optimality conditions, where effort is always zero, and debt responds positively with,
and is uniquely determined by, the contemporaneous shock. Moreover, it shows the
debt optimality condition binding at sufficiently low levels of θ, i.e. debt is zero for
θ ≤ 0.9.
In terms of welfare, measured by V I and V v, while the dictator gets an ex-
pected PDV of 119.93, voters receive only 59.93. The difference is the PDV of
5This can be though of reflecting the real world fact that tax rates are considerably less volatile
than debt.
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Figure 2.2: Shock and Policy in the Dictatorship.
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ego rents for being in office, χ. Note that, for the parameters of the model, these
two values are the boundaries of any solution of the democratic scenarios, for the
incumbent and voters, respectively.
2.4.2 The Role of Elections as a Disciplining Device
Next I analyze a democratic environment under the polar cases of trans-
parency, assuming that the unique instrument voters have to punish the incumbent
is their ability to vote against him.
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2.4.2.1 Full Transparency
Under full transparency, the observed signal is the true value of the shock.
Both, the incumbent and voters, observe the same variables, and this is common
knowledge. Thus, there are no informational asymmetries. Voters can exactly pre-
dict the incumbent’s behavior for each reelection rule, and so, optimally they will
propose a Ū schedule that maximizes their utilities by simultaneously providing
enough incentives for the incumbent to ensure he never chooses to expropriate. I
formalize this idea in two propositions:
Proposition 1. Under full transparency the optimal rule is incentive
compatible with equality and p = 1.
To prove this, it is easy to see that among all Ū schedules associated with p = 1,
the one that is incentive compatible, Ū ic dominates the rest. Now, consider a new,
higher schedule Ūh = Ū ic for all θ 6= θ̂ and Ūh(θ̂) > Ū ic(θ̂), making it a potential
candidate for the optimal reelection rule. But p(θ̂) = 0 so Ūh(θ̂) is never delivered
by any incumbent and thus Ūh cannot dominate Ū ic.
Proposition 2. Rent extraction is positive even if there are no infor-
mation asymmetries 6.
To prove it, consider a regime which differs considerably from a democracy, in which
a contract to run the government forever in a fully transparent world is auctioned
among the population. The contract is enforced by killing the incumbent in case
6Persson, Roland and Tabellini call it “rents of being in power”.
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he does not respect it. A first citizen will place a bid that consists of a constant
per period effort level, and debt satisfying (2.14). If no other citizen places a higher
bid the game ends and payoffs to the ruler and citizen are distributed according to
V I and V v, respectively. The unique equilibrium of this game is e∗ = φ−1(χ) or
zero-rent-extraction: no citizen will offer a higher bid since his payoff as a ruler will
be lower than as a citizen; on the other side, any outstanding bid ê ∈ [0, φ−1(χ))
will not survive in the game since it is a dominant strategy for the bidding citizen
to play e∗ and get V I(e∗) = V v(e∗) > V v(ê). I call the solution to this game the
social planner solution and denote it’s expected discounted utility as V sp.
The social planner problem is solved following the same method outlined in the
dictatorship. The idea is to choose only τ and d conditional on θ since e = e∗. The
two first order conditions look exactly the same as in the case of the dictatorship,
i.e.
V sp(e∗) = V v(e = 0) +
e∗
(1− β) < V
o = V v(e = 0) +
χ
(1− β)
In other words U spt < U
o
t for all θ by the amount χ − θe∗. Finally, note that
proposition 2 is equivalent to stating that no social planner solution can be achieved.
To see this, let me assume a social planner solution can be achieved. By proposition
1 the solution has to be IC, thus









⇒ U spt = U ot
since V spt = V
v
t , which is a contradiction.
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Intuitively, and even if effort were to be observable and enforceable in the
democratic setup, voters cannot extract all of the incumbent’s ego rents for being in
office since at this effort-level, the lifetime expected utility of voters and incumbent
is identical, but the period utility of expropriation versus observation of the rule
is higher. Therefore, the incumbent is always tempted to expropriate today and
get voters’ utility in the future. In any case, under full transparency, ego rents will
reach the minimum since voters can compute the incumbent’s optimal policy for each
contingent minimum utility level that voters demand in order to keep reappointing
him. The maximum per period level of effort that voters can demand is e∗ =
φ−1(βχ), which comes from the no-expropriation-condition χ− φ(e)/1− β ≥ χ.
Figure 2.3 presents an extensive form of the game and helps to visualize the
equilibrium concept. Each ending node shows the payoffs for Incumbent 1 and
Voters, respectively. Voters move first by proposing the reelection rule Ū . I have
claimed that there exists only one reelection rule, Ū∗ that solves the Full Trans-
parency problem, which is IC. Suppose Ū > Ū∗ and that the equilibrium strategy
for any incumbent is to Fulfill Ū . Then, given that Incumbent 2 should Fulfill, In-
cumbent 1 has incentives to deviate and choose to Expropriate. Thus, Fulfill cannot
be an equilibrium. If, on the other hand, voters demand Ū < Ū∗, the best response
for any incumbent is to choose Fulfill, just as with Ū∗, which is the only equilibrium.
Full Transparency Simulation
To obtain the solution for full transparency I make a guess for Ū , calculate
V I and V v and check the IC constraint. A new Ū is proposed and the process
repeated. Both rules are compared and kept the one that renders the higher V v. A
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new Ū is then proposed and the iteration continues until no Ū is beaten (which, not
coincidentally, occurs when p = 1).
Figure 2.4 shows the policy path of the full transparency equilibrium, for
the same stream of shocks as in figure 2.2. In this case, the incumbent’s effort is
always positive and constant at the level of e∗ = φ−1(βχ). For comparison purposes
the figure also shows the Social Planner’s levels of effort and debt. Under full
transparency debt equals zero in equilibrium, even when θ is high. This outcome is
the result of Ū being conditional only on the signal, therefore, asking for higher Ū
when θ is high, would bring expropriation if also dt−1 is high. In other words, the
reelection rule is not a full contingency contract, perhaps because it is too costly to
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Figure 2.4: Shock and Policy under Full Transparency and
Social Planner.
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Effort: Full Transparency (solid), Social Planner (dashed)
write down such a contract.7
At equilibrium, voters obtain an expected discounted utility of 82.47, con-
trasted with the 59.93 that they get in the dictatorship. In the Social Planner’s
benchmark case, where debt follows the optimal path and effort can be set at a
no-rent-extraction level, voters and incumbent would have obtained 83.20. Fiscal
outcomes are left for the next section where I compare them across transparency
levels. I now turn to analyze the other polar case.
7Admittedly, this feature is not part of the model.
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2.4.2.2 Full Opacity
Full opacity of the budgetary process is defined as the situation in which voters’
estimate or signal, θ̃, of the true fiscal shock is not informative, meaning that the
observation of any θ̃ assigns the same probability of occurrence to an specific θ.
In this case the type of solution of the model is similar to that of Ferejohn 1986,
in which voters will ask for a time invariant minimum utility level and will keep
reappointing the incumbent as long as he continues to fulfill this requirement. There
is an important difference with the Ferejohn model though, which is that now the
actual shock, θ, does not uniquely determine the policy outcome since debt carried
from the last period will now play a role.
Solution and Simulation for Full Opacity
Table 2.2 describes the full opacity equilibrium. If voters were to demand 3.70
as the cutoff rule for reelection, the incumbent will always choose to follow the rule,
that is, the probability of expropriation is zero. The PDV for incumbent and voter
are 93.64 and 74.29 respectively.
Raising the bar to 3.80 per period makes no difference in the decision of the
incumbent with respect to expropriation; even when there are some possible states
of the world in which the incumbent should choose to expropriate, namely a com-
bination of a bad shock (θ = .8) and a very high level of outstanding debt, these
states have a zero probability of occurrence (unless, of course, those are the initial
conditions, but even in such case this can only happen for the first government since
the outstanding debt for the next government following expropriation will never be
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high enough). Accordingly, the PDV for incumbent and voter under a rule of 3.80
are 87.09 and 76.29, respectively. As can be seen, given the non linearity of the
disutility of effort, a slight increase in voter’s utility causes a large decrease in the
incumbent’s utility.
Going beyond 3.80, progressively increases the probability of expropriation,
but this does not necessarily mean that V v will be lower since at first the marginal
gains for demanding a higher Ū will dominate the loses in case of expropriation,
given that 1 − p is very low. As one progress with increments in Ū , the second
effect gains in importance over the first, reaching equilibrium at the point where
they equal each other. The maximum is attained at Ū∗ = 3.830 with a probability
of expropriation of .018 and expected PDV for incumbent and voter equal to 85.54
and 76.61, respectively.
Table 2.2: Full Opacity Equilibrium Rule.
Ū 3.700 3.800 3.810 3.820 3.830 3.840 3.850
1-p 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.016 0.018 0.036 0.052
V v 74.29 76.29 76.37 76.39 76.61 76.42 76.35
V I 93.64 87.09 86.49 86.19 85.54 85.47 85.31
Figure 2.5 depicts policy paths under full opacity. Debt is more volatile and
average debt is higher than in the dictatorship. Moreover, the incumbent incurs
in higher levels of debt when θ is low and less productive, to help him fulfill the
reelection rule. The correlation between d and θ is −0.83. In contrast to the other
two cases, effort shows variability and can even be higher, in some periods, than in
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the full transparent case, although average effort is, of course, lower. Similarly to
debt, the incumbent chooses higher levels of effort for lower levels of θ, being their
correlations −0.87. In the figure we can see an expropriation period (and therefore
a change of ruler) when effort reaches zero. In this case, expropriation occurs after
a second consecutive worst shock.
Figure 2.5: Shock and Policy under Full Opacity.





















2.4.2.3 The Intermediate cases: High Transparency, Low Transparency,
and High Opacity
Consider the intermediate cases. Here, I am introducing a third de facto state
variable: θ̃. Voters now condition the reelection rule on the observed signal. I explore
three distinct cases. High Transparency, a situation in which the signal is always
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informative; Low Transparency, a case where sometimes the signal is informative
and; High Opacity, a circumstance in which the signal is almost never informative,
and so it resembles Full Opacity. Figure A.1 (shown in the appendix) shows how θ
and θ̃ relate to each other depending on ε.
Figure 2.6: Shock and Policy under High Transparency.
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In the top panel of figures 2.6 and 2.7 it can be seen how θ and θ̃ move together
across time. Although θ̃ is a good approximation of θ with ε = .1 it does a very bad
job when ε = .3. By moving towards more opaque scenarios, these figures illustrate
how debt and effort are progressively employed only to salvage office, rather than
for efficiency reasons, which are measured by the contemporaneous correlations of e
and d with θ (look at the bottom of table 2.3).
Figure 2.7 shows to periods of expropriation. The first episode coincides with
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Figure 2.7: Shock and Policy under High Opacity.
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the one obtained under full opacity. This episode would have being avoided if at
least one of the signals would have had coincided with the true shock. The second
episode is the consequence of two consecutive very uninformative signals, that make
voters demand too much from the incumbent.
2.4.3 The Effects of Transparency: Welfare, Public Good, Expendi-
tures, and Debt
After examining the equilibrium behavior of the incumbent under a complete
set of transparency regimes, I am in a position to address one of the main questions
of the chapter: how does the level of transparency in the budgetary process affect
fiscal outcomes, and ultimately constituent’s welfare?
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Table 2.3 compares welfare, the average level of debt, and the average levels of
public good and expenditures across all regimes. Amongst the democratic regimes,
Voter’s welfare (V v) is higher the more transparent the regime is. Whereas mean
Public Expenditures, Gmean (where the period t public expenditure is defined as
Gt = τt +dt−Dt), are the same across all regimes due to a no-violation of the inter-
temporal government budget constraint, public good goes one-to-one with welfare
since utility coming from the private good is identical across regimes. The highlight
of the table is the average level of debt, that decreases as the level of transparency
improves.
Table 2.3: Welfare, Public Goods, Expenditure, and Debt.
Descriptive Statistics
Regime Dictator Social Full High Low High Full
Planer Transparency Transparency Transparency Opacity Opacity
V v 59.93 83.20 82.47 80.71 78.11 77.01 76.61
g̃mean 2.92 4.18 4.12 4.05 3.97 3.89 3.89
Gmean 2.92 3.00 3.00 2.99 2.99 2.98 2.98
dmean 0.047 0.047 0.000 0.050 0.065 0.072 0.087
emean 0.00 1.155 1.125 1.058 0.973 0.925 0.906
g̃/G 1.00 1.39 1.38 1.35 1.33 1.31 1.30
corr(e,θ) — — — -0.39 -0.63 -0.75 -0.87
corr(d,θ) 0.96 0.96 — -0.48 -0.64 -0.74 -0.83
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2.4.4 Numeric Constraints
Transparency in the budgetary process is by no means the only force that
conditions the realization of fiscal outcomes. In fact, the institutional arrangement
that seems to capture most of the attention in the literature is the set of numeric rules
that the executive has to face at the moment of elaboration, approval and execution
of the budget. These numeric constraints can take the form of specific limits to
expenditures, debt and deficit, or restrictions to the flow of resources between and
within programs, agencies and levels of government. The constraints could even
be restrictions to the flow of resources between different fiscal periods. Across the
world (at the aggregate level), the most extended use of a numeric constraint is an
explicit cap on the budget deficit.
To incorporate this set of restrictions into the model, I condense them into a
single de jure budgetary rule. This allows me to evaluate, in the simplest manner,
the effect these rules can have when there are asymmetries in the information that
players are receiving, and thus address the possibility that the government can
escape legal consequences by exploiting financial loopholes. Specifically, I introduce
an at-most-zero-deficit rule that has to be observed by the incumbent with the
same consequences as the minimum utility rule already imposed. That is, if the
incumbent fails to fulfill it, he will be voted out of office in the following election.
The problem with this rule, in contrast to the minimum utility rule, is that voters
cannot directly observe the actual levels of expenditure, but rather, they can only
observe the reported level by the incumbent. Henceforth, I will call any deviation
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of the reported level from the actual level creative accounting. The extent to which
the incumbent can use creative accounting as an instrument will be determined by
the transparency level of the economy.
Formally, the at-most-zero-deficit rule means that the incumbent would be
reelected if, in addition to delivering Ū , he also fulfils:
Gt ≤ τt (2.16)
The problem is that, even when τ is directly observed by voters, G is not
since the actual d is revealed with one period lag, and so equation (2.16) is not
enforceable. At this point it is necessary to introduce a bit more structure about
how creative accounting can take place in the model. Following Milesi-Ferretti (2004)
I assume that the extent of creative accounting is inversely related to the degree of
transparency, but I do not attempt to derive it from within the model. This ad-
hoc formulation is a convenience. Otherwise, one would have to introduce more
structure about effort which would be as arbitrary as directly modelling creative
accounting. In particular, the game is modified by assuming that after the delivery
of the public good, the government reports the amount of debt that accrued during
its production, d̃t.
Any deviation from the true value of debt, that is if d̃t 6= dt, will be consid-
ered creative accounting. To make things simple, I assume that the government’s
maximum amount of creative accounting without being caught is: dt± εdt, but that
any attempt to engage in creative accounting outside this interval will be detected
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Figure 2.8: Timing of the Game.
by voters with probability one. For example, ε = .1 means that the government can
falsely report up to 10 per cent of the period debt without being caught.
Note that equation (2.16) is equivalent to dt ≤ D(dt−1). In terms of the model
I then introduce the enforceable at-most-zero-deficit rule:
d̃t − err = (1− ε)dt − err ≤ D(dt−1) (2.17)
For all positive dt−1 the maximum amount of possible diversion increases with
ε. The term err, used for errors and omissions, is assumed to be constant across
transparency and is needed in order to avoid a zero-debt trap: without err, once dt−1
reaches zero the maximum amount of diversion is zero independently of the degree of
transparency, something that would trivialize the solution. In other words, instead
of zero, the rule is transformed to an at-most-err -rule. In any case, err is set to the
minimum.8
8The minimum err depends on how fine the discrete state space is; the finer the grid the smaller
err will be, defined such that, if the d state space consists of n points and we index d by n where
d(1) = 0, d(n) = dmax, then err = d(2) − d(1). In other words, if dt−1 = 0, dt can take the first
positive value.
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Figure 2.8 shows how the rule affects policy decision. After observing g̃t, ct
and d̃t voters learn if Ū was satisfied and they have a rough idea of how much
debt was utilized. After the (audited) value of dt−1 is released voters also learn
if the enforceable rule was satisfied. In this game, a government is voted out for
three possible reasons: If Ū is not satisfied, if creative accounting is detected (d̃t <
(1− ε)dt), or if the enforceable at-most-zero-deficit rule is violated.
Even when the ad-hoc rule obviously makes it easier for opaque regimes to
engage in creative accounting, it does not trivialize the outcome since the rule will
be binding for some states in all regimes. That is to say, it imposes an effective cap
on the per period debt. This can be seen in figures 2.9 and 2.10. The imposition of
the deficit rule modifies the government’s choice of optimal debt: even when debt
moves in the same direction as in the unconstrained case—this is more pronounced
as opacity increases—debt volatility is significantly reduced. In the constrained case
debt is almost never as high as in the unconstrained case, but it is never as low either,
reaching levels of zero debt only in the expropriation periods. Therefore, even when
one should never expect to see debt levels as high as in the unconstrained case, this
does not imply that average debt will be lower. The government finds it optimal
to carry positive amounts of debt from period to period, since this gives it bigger
room for engaging in creative accounting in order to smooth effort. In particular,
in scenarios where there is no full transparency, the incumbent uses debt to fulfill
the requirements and be reappointed, precisely in bad states of the world, when he
is demanded relatively high levels of public good. But now the amount of debt that
can be issued will be constrained by the amount outstanding last period, giving him
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the incentive to always carry over positive amounts of debt. This incentive will be
enhanced as opacity increases.
Figure 2.9: Policy Comparison under High Transparency.
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Effort: U(bar) (solid), U(bar) + Legal Constraint (dashed)
Table 2.4 presents the same set of results as table 2.3 but with the addition
of the deficit rule for all the democratic regimes. As mentioned, this cap does
not necessarily imply a lower average debt across all regimes. Whereas the highly
transparent regime does reduce its average debt, the more opaque regimes increase
average debt by non-insignificant magnitudes. Moreover, the introduction of the
numerical rule improves voter’s conditions in the highly transparent scenario and
worsens it in the more opaque ones.
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Figure 2.10: Policy Comparison under High Opacity.
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Effort: U(bar) (solid), U(bar) + Legal Constraint (dashed)
2.5 Concluding Remarks
In a simple model in which voters can coordinate perfectly to demand results
from the policymaker in charge of the government (who typically will enjoy an
informational advantage about the true actions taken in the production of public
goods), the model shows that the best way to curtail his unproductive activities and
curb a tendency to incur greater debt is by reducing the informational advantage
directly. That is, by increasing the level of transparency of the whole budgetary
process. On the contrary, if voters’ strategy is to impose numeric constraints over
imperfectly observed fiscal outcomes, these will have the desired effect only if the
level of transparency is sufficiently high. When transparency is non-existent, the
imposition of a numeric constraint will in fact carry the contrary effect, that is,
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Table 2.4: Welfare, Public Goods, Expenditure, and Debt.
Descriptive Statistics with at-most-zero-Deficit Rule
Regime Social Full High Low High Full
Planer Transparency Transparency Transparency Opacity Opacity
V v 83.11 82.47 80.82 77.39 76.08 75.54
g̃mean 4.17 4.12 4.06 4.00 3.91 3.91
Gmean 3.00 3.00 2.99 2.99 2.98 2.98
dmean 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.072 0.083 0.102
emean 1.155 1.125 1.061 0.956 0.921 0.931
g̃/G 1.39 1.38 1.35 1.34 1.31 1.31
corr(e,θ) — — -0.43 -0.71 -0.80 -0.93
corr(d,θ) — — 0.07 -0.44 -0.54 -0.66
higher average debt and lower expected welfare.
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Chapter 3
The Relevance of Budgetary Procedures on Fiscal Outcomes in Rich
and LDC
3.1 Introduction
Fiscal outcomes depend not only on the history and presently enacted policies
but on the institutions that restrict these policies. In this chapter, I investigate
empirically how budgetary institutions influence several fiscal outcomes.
Budgetary Institutions are defined as the set of all the rules and regulations
according to which budgets are prepared, approved and carried out (Alesina and
Perotti (1999)). In the literature of budgetary institutions, these have generally
been divided into three different categories (Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Stein,
Talvi and Grisanti (1999)). The first are rules that impose numerical constraints on
the deficit, such as balanced-budget rules that, by law, do not allow public deficits
to go above a pre-established threshold.
The second category are the procedural rules that dictate the timing and mech-
anisms by which the executive drafts the budget, its discussion and approval in the
legislature, and its posterior implementation. These procedural rules determine the
relative strength of the players involved in the budgeting process within the exec-
utive and between the executive and the legislature. In this literature, procedural
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rules are classified on a hierarchical-collegial spectrum. At the stage of budgeting
drafting, hierarchical rules are those that tilt the balance of power in favor of the
finance minister, who faces the whole government budget constraint, and in detri-
ment of spending ministers, who care almost exclusively about their own portfolio.
On the contrary, collegial rules are those in which the role of the finance minister
is more passive and limited. At the approval stage, hierarchical rules are those that
impose more constraints on the legislature’s ability to modify the budget proposed
by the executive, and in particular, on its ability to increase the size of the budget
or the deficit. At the execution stage, hierarchical rules are those that limit the
possibility of the legislature to increase the budget once it has been approved.
The third category of budgetary institutions is the degree of transparency of
the budgetary process. A more transparent budgetary process involves ready access
to reliable, comprehensive, timely, understandable, and internationally comparable
information on government activities, such that the electorate and financial markets
can accurately assess the government’s financial position and the true cost and
benefits of government activities, including their present and future economic and
social implications (see Kopits and Craig (1998)). Typically, policymakers have no
incentives to be truthful. For instance, in order to delay unpopular measures to
cut a foreseen fiscal deficit, the government can overestimate the rate of growth of
the economy to hide such deficits or simply move some liabilities to special extra-
budgetary accounts. The ability of the government to act in this manner, without
detection, will be determined by the degree of transparency of the budgetary process.
The empirical treatment on the effects of budgetary institutions encompass
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works that concentrate on a specific category as well as more integral approaches that
study budgetary institutions as a whole and then tries to disentangle the individual
effects.
In a series of papers, von Hagen (1992) and von Hagen and Harden (1994)
and (1996), study the effects of budgetary institutions as a whole. They do this by
lumping together, in a single index, hierarchcal/collegial procedures with measures
of transparency, in twelve European Community countries. They find that more
hierarchical and transparent budgetary institutions are associated with more fiscal
discipline. Exploring further, von Hagen (1992) suggests that transparency comes
second to hierarchical features in order of importance. De Haan et al (1999) use new
information available to update von Hagen’s index for an almost identical sample.
These authors corroborate von Hagen’s result that better budgetary institutions
as a whole induce fiscal discipline. However, although the results are statistically
significant, they are not economically important as was previously claimed.
Alesina et al (1999) pursue a more integral approach by constructing separate
measures for every category of the budgeting process that were mentioned earlier,
and an aggregate measure as well, for a sample of twenty Latin American countries.
Employing fiscal deficits as their fiscal outcome measure, these authors arrive at the
conclusion that fiscal procedures matter for fiscal deficits among Latin American
countries, but when they look at the disaggregated indexes, they find that numer-
ical rules and hierarchical procedures matter but transparency does not. They do
acknowledge, however, that the “results on transparency probably say more about
the difficulty of measuring it, than about its effect on fiscal discipline” (quote from
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Alesina and Perotti (1996)). Filc and Scartascini (2004), employing a new data set
that permits them to measure budgetary institutions ten years later, closely follow
Alesina et al (1999), and perform the same exercise for a sample of eleven Latin
American countries arriving at the same conclusions.
Alt and Lassen (2003), using data from 19 OECD countries concentrate exclu-
sively on the effects of fiscal transparency on public debt and the central government
expenditure. These authors make a successful attempt at providing guidance about
what should contain a good measure of transparency. They find significant and
economically important effects of transparency, especially for public debt.
Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) study the effects of hierarchical vis-a-vis col-
legial institutions in the form of government fragmentation for twenty OECD coun-
tries. From the legislative side, a government is more fragmented as the total number
of parties in the ruling coalition increases (Coalition Size). From the executive side,
a government is more fragmented as the number of spending ministers increases
(Cabinet Size). More fragmented governments are associated with more collegial
institutions. They found that cabinet size had a strong effect on expenditures dur-
ing the seventies and early eighties but that this relationship disappeared in the late
eighties and nineties. Coalition size, on the contrary, only seemed to play a role
on fiscal outcomes during the late eighties and nineties, but this result is not very
robust since it vanishes under different specifications.
As can be noted from the preceding paragraphs, the general strategy has been
to construct some measure of budgetary institutions and regress an indicator of fiscal
outcomes—public debt, public expenditures, or public deficits—on this measure,
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controlling for a variety of other potentially influential variables.
One weakness in the cross-country literature is that the available studies in-
volve a very small set of countries selected either according to their development
level, or else paired according to their geographical position. In principle, there
is no reason to suspect that budgetary procedures lead to different effects in fis-
cal outcomes in rich versus poor countries, once all other things have been taken
into account. The degree of development of a country, or other socioeconomic fac-
tors, might affect the way in which budgetary procedures act over fiscal outcomes.
However, to the best of my knowledge, no study has taken this question into con-
sideration.
There are two possible reasons for this shortcoming: In terms of supply, the
lack of institutional data for a broad set of countries is a fact. Researchers have tried
to create this data in the most economical way by sending surveys to officials in the
countries of interest. It is easier for the researcher to obtain a completed survey
if respondents belong to a club like the OECD, the European Commission, or the
OEA and these organizations are the ones requesting and validating the information.
Demand could also account for this shortcoming, given that the sample size is small
in nature, and it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to take into account all
other characteristics besides budgetary institutions that affect fiscal outcomes. By
avoiding countries that are too dissimilar in the same data set one can potentially
reduce one source of heterogeneity.
A new (and still growing) data set of a survey on budgetary practices, with
the broadest country coverage so far, has recently been made available to the public
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(OECD/World Bank (2003)). Following the common strategy in the literature, in
the present chapter I exploit this new data set to construct measures of the three
budgetary institutions that were described above, the set of numerical rules, the
set of procedural rules, and the degree of budgetary transparency, and assess their
influence on a series of fiscal outcomes. Taking advantage of the diversity of countries
surveyed, I test the generality of the results obtained here and elsewhere. Moreover,
the two principal conclusions of the theoretical model presented in the previous
chapter are empirically tested.
The common strategy of constructing indexes to account for budgeting insti-
tutions is by no means the optimal approach but rather (and probably) the only one
available. In particular, quoting Poterba and von Hagen (1999), the use of “such
additive indexes assume a strong form of substitution between different components
of the budget process, and there is little evidence to support the assumption under-
lying such aggregation”. In this chapter, I conduct an experiment to understand the
severity of this assumption. The results of this exercise show that the constructed
measures are indeed very sensitive to the information included in each index and
thus, in general terms, these components are far from being good substitutes.
The main results of this chapter are twofold. First, when the whole sample of
countries are studied together, budgetary institutions affect the level of fiscal out-
comes, but this effect seems to come only from the level of transparency and not
from numerical constraints on the budget or more hierarchical procedures. These
results, however, are not independent of the country’s level of economic develop-
ment. In particular, the results are reinforced for the richest countries but basically
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disappear for less developed economies, which suggests that in the whole sample
the results are driven by more advanced economies. Second, contrary to what was
postulated in the previous chapter, for this sample of countries these does not seem
to exist an interaction effect between transparency and numerical constraints.
Before leaving the introduction to this chapter it is important to point out that
in the literature, and this work is no exception, budgetary institutions are treated
as being exogenous, while it is also recognized that they are indeed endogenous,
particularly to past fiscal outcomes. The justification to this treatment is that, at
least in the short run, institutions are reasonably difficult to change, and therefore
are changed relatively infrequently. Basically, “since it is costly and complex to
change institutions, the existing ones have to be very unsatisfactory before it is worth
changing them; as a result, there is a strong “status quo” bias in institutional reform.
Therefore, at least up to a point, one can use institutional features as explanatory
variables” (quote from Alesina and Perotti (1999)). The rest of the chapter is
organized as follows: section two explains the methodology for the construction of
the budgetary institutions indexes; in section three the standard econometric model
is presented; section four addresses the issue of perfect substitution between the
components of each index; section five explores the possibility of interaction effects
and, finally, the conclusions of the chapter are presented in section six.
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3.2 Measuring Numerical Rules, Procedural Rules, and Transparency
The data for the construction of the indices was obtained from the OECD/World
Bank Survey of Budget Practices and Procedures (2003). The database contains
more that 350 question covering all sorts of issues about the budgeting process.
I started by selecting those questions that were directly related to the three in-
stitutional categories mentioned earlier. From that set, I eliminated questions that
were too similar—after corroborating that answers were the same—and I eliminated
questions with ambiguous interpretations. At the end I ended up with 11 questions
that were relevant to numerical rules, 10 questions relevant for procedural rules
(hierarchical/collegial), and 14 questions for transparency.
To construct each index, every answer was given a value that ranged between
zero and one, where higher values reflected institutions that should enhance fiscal
discipline. Since, in general, questions had more than two answers, partial weights
were proportionately distributed, following the methods of Alesina et al (1999).
Finally, the three indices were standardized so that each ranges from zero to one,
which eased comparisons between them.
3.2.1 Transparency
What is transparency? How can one budgetary process be defined to be more
transparent than other? Transparency is not a one-dimensional concept; the litera-
ture contains many definitions that agree on the central issues of transparency, but
authors assign different weights on its components, and omit others. In this manner,
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the answer to the first question determines the answer to the second.
Poterba and von Hagen (1999) define a transparent budget process as one
that provides clear information on all aspects of government fiscal policy. Budgets
that include numerous special accounts and that fail to consolidate all fiscal activity
into a single “bottom line” measure are not transparent. Budgets that are readily
available to the public and to participants in the policy-making process, and those
that present consolidated information, are transparent.
Kopits and Craig (1998) define fiscal transparency as openness towards the
public at large about government structure and functions, fiscal policy intentions,
public sector accounts, and projections. It involves ready access to reliable, com-
prehensive, timely, understandable, and internationally comparable information on
government activities, such that the electorate and financial markets can accurately
assess the government’s financial position and the true cost and benefits of govern-
ment activities, including their present and future economic and social implications.
Based on these and other definitions, Alt and Lassen (2003) try to rationalize
and provide guidance of what a good measure of budgetary transparency would be.
For this purpose they identify four main characteristics of transparency. First, more
transparent procedures should process more information, and other things being
equal, use fewer documents. This speaks to openness and ease of access and monitor-
ing. Second, transparency is increased by the possibility of independent verification,
which has been experimentally shown to be a key feature in making communication
persuasive and credible. Third, there should be a commitment to non-arbitrary
language: words and classifications should have clear, shared, unequivocal mean-
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ings. Finally, the presence of more justification increases transparency, reducing the
possibility of strategic creativity that I have perviously mentioned.
To construct the transparency index, the following questions were employed,
shown under the Alt and Lassen (2003) classification:
• More information, other things equal, in fewer documents
– Does the annual central government budget documentation submitted to
the legislature/parliament contain multi-year expenditure estimates?
– At what interval is information on the in-year budget implementation
released?
– Are the following accounts (assets, liabilities, government equity, rev-
enues, expenses) integrated into the accounting system to facilitate the
preparation of financial statements?
• Independent verification
– Does the government announce the release dates for information on the
in-year budget implementation in advance?
– Are economic assumptions available for scrutiny?
– Is this information audited?
– Are audited final accounts published and available publicly?
– Are internal audit procedures clear and subject to effective process review
by external auditors?
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– Are the findings of the National Audit Body available to the public?
– Are government entities subject to financial audits by an external audi-
tor?
• Non-arbitrary language
– Does the government uses accrual accounting in its financial statements?
– Is there a unified accounting and budgeting classification system?
• More justification
– Does the budget documentation contain a discussion of what impact vari-
ations in the key economic assumptions (sensitivity analysis) would have
on the budget outturn?
– Does the published information have a comparison between actual and
planned spending for the period covered?
The main transparency index has more weight on the verification side and
in the type of information presented, and less on the amount of information per
se. It seems more important to have fewer pieces of transcendental, bottom-lined
and audited information at the relevant time than tons of data that might confuse
rather than clarify the government objectives. In any case, for robustness, several
alternative measures of transparency are later employed.
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3.2.2 Measuring Numerical Constraints
The possibility of running larger deficits or increasing the level of expenditures
is, in principle, established in the legislation. Other things being equal one should
observe higher fiscal deficits, debt levels or higher expenditures the less constrained
the budgetary process is.
Ideally it would be possible to distinguish between restrictions to the overall
budget and to the composition of it and, presumably, only the first type should affect
aggregate fiscal outcomes. In practice, such separation might not exist; budgetary
processes that allow inter program transfers, for instance, can create a bigger budget
by ex-ante inflating accounts or programs that are not so jealously watched in com-
parison to others and then making ex-post transfers. If this type of connection is of
true importance or just a second order effect is a question that I try to answer here.
For this reason, the questions used to construct the numerical constraint index were
separated in three categories: those that refer to direct restrictions to the overall
budget, those that refer to transfers within the fiscal budget, and those that refer
to transfers between different budgetary years.
• Direct Restrictions
– In developing the budget, are there fiscal rules placing limits on Executive
fiscal policy discretion?
– Can you change expenditures outside the budget process?
• Between Restrictions
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– Is it possible to carry-over unused appropriations for operating costs
(salaries, etc.) from one year to another?
– Is it possible to carry-over unused appropriations for investments (build-
ing construction, etc.) from one year to another?
– Is it possible to carry-over unused appropriations for transfer programs
from one year to another?
– Is it possible for managers of ministries/government organizations to bor-
row against future appropriations for operating costs (salaries, etc.)?
– Is it possible to borrow against future appropriations for investments
(building construction, etc.)?
• Within Restrictions
– Are there laws, regulations or policies that define the permitted uses of
the budget reserves and the decision-making authorities for approving
allocations from the reserves?
– Are government organizations allowed to transfer funds between operat-
ing expenditures, investments and program funds?
– Can appropriations be reallocated from one program to another?
– More generally, are transfers permitted between capital investments or
transfer programs (social security pensions, etc.) and operating expendi-
tures?
I compute three main numerical constraints indices. The first one assigns
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equal weight to each question which implicitly gives more importance to within
and between constraints since both represent nine out of eleven questions. Two
additional measures are then computed to tackle this problem. The second index
gives half the weight to direct restrictions and the other half to the within and
between constraints. The third index disregards the within and between effects
concentrating only on direct constraints.
3.2.3 Measuring Procedural Rules
There are two distinguishable moments in the budgeting process in which the
player’s relative power can affect the size and composition of the budget.1 First is
the relative strength that the Finance Minister, assumed to be a fiscal conservative,
has over the expending ministers. Second, the relative strength of the executive
versus the legislative, in which each legislator has the incentive to push for pork
barrel financed projects of delimited benefits. A relatively strong finance minister
and a relatively strong executive power results in more hierarchical procedures. The
hierarchical index is constructed from ten questions that, in turn, are classified as
Finance Minister Strength and Executive strength:
• Finance Minister Strength
– Are there fixed spending limits set for initial Ministry spending plans?
– Who has the last word? How are disputes between Ministries and the
central budget authority resolved?
1See Alesina and Perotti (1999) for a full exposition of the topic.
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– What percentage of the initial executive branch budget is decided by
the President/Prime Minister/Principal Executive (i.e. not worked out
between Ministries)?
• Executive strength
– Do the expenditure estimates require authorization by the legislature/parliament?
– If the budget is not approved by the legislature before the start of the
fiscal year, which of the following describes the consequences:
– Are there any restrictions on the rights of the legislature to modify the
detailed budget proposed by the executive?
– What form do these restrictions take?
– Notwithstanding any legal restrictions on the legislators ability to modify
the budget, is a vote on the budget considered a vote of confidence in
the government, i.e., the government would resign if any changes are
approved to its budget proposal?
– Does the legislature have any opportunity to formally debate/discuss
overall budget policy prior to the introduction of (or just after) the exec-
utives’s budget?
– If allowed to modify the governments budget, what is the treatment of
amendments proposed by members of the legislature to the governments
budget proposal?
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3.2.4 Budgetary Procedures and its Components
The addition of the three sub-indices, that is, numerical rules, hierarchical, and
transparency, constitutes what we will refer hereafter as the budgetary procedures
index, following the convention in the literature as Alesina et al (1999), von Hagen
(1996) or de Haan et al (1999). Table 3.1 and Figures 3.1 to 3.4 describe these
indexes.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics.
Numerical Rules Hierarchical Transparency Budgetary Procedures
No. of questions 11 10 14 35
Max 0.86 0.88 0.82 2.28
Min 0.14 0.28 0.42 1.27
Average 0.51 0.59 0.64 1.73
Standard Deviation 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.30
Std. Dev./Average 0.39 0.27 0.17 0.18
Corr. vs. Num. Rules 1.00 0.42 -0.13 0.82
Corr. vs. Hierarchical – 1.00 -0.13 0.75
Corr. vs. Transparency – – 1.00 0.20
Figure 3.1 shows the budgetary procedures index. It shows that budgetary in-
stitutions are more fiscally conservative in Latin American countries than in Western
European countries as a group; or that New Zealand and Italy have broadly the same
set of budgetary institutions, and that these countries have more stringent institu-
tions than the United States. Looking deeper into the components of budgeting
procedures—figures 3.2 to 3.4—, we can see that countries can have the same aggre-
gate level for very different reasons. Comparing again New Zealand and Italy, the
54

















































































































































































































former country scores below average in numerical rules and hierarchical procedures
but has the most transparent process of the sample, while Italy has average marks in
all categories. The United States and Belgium have institutions that situate on the
extremes: both countries rank amongst the highest on budgetary transparency but
amongst the lowest on hierarchical procedures—Belgium, also, is one of the least
numerically restricted countries.
These figures send the message that any conclusion based on aggregated mea-
sures of budgetary institutions (Alesina et al (1999), de Haan et al (1999)) are
hard to interpret since the relative forces of each institutional feature cannot be
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addressed. Moreover, given that not all institutional categories move together, ag-
gregate measures could tend to neutralize the true effect of budgetary institutions
on fiscal outcomes.
3.3 The Effects of Budgetary Institutions on Fiscal Outcomes.
This section presents a series of econometric models that try to answer the
question of how the different budgetary institutions, in the form of the constructed
indices, affect fiscal outcomes across countries. First, I introduce the benchmark
model, which controls for economic and demographic variables that has been shown
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to affect fiscal outcomes. Second, I study possible differences in the estimated pa-
rameters, depending on the degree of development of the countries in the sample.
Finally, I add to the model a series of political variables that can also affect fiscal
outcomes.
3.3.1 Data and the Benchmark Model
The sources for the fiscal outcomes variables are the World Economic Outlook
(WEO), produced by the International Monetary Fund, the World Development
Indicators (WDI), produced by the World Bank, and the OECD. I tried to use only
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WDI data complemented with OECD data but this turned out to be impossible. The
reason is that WDI data is very incomplete and volatile due to periodical revisions—
I ended up having less observations with the 2005 version of the data set than with
the 2003. The latest year for which a fiscal outcomes variable could be reasonable
completed using WDI and OECD is 1999. This has two main disadvantages. First,
the constructed institutional measures reflect the state of budgetary practices for
the years 2002; even when it is very likely that institutions did not changed much
during those three years, we do not really know how big this problem could be.
If institutions in general evolved towards obtaining more stringent fiscal outcomes,
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then I would potentially be underestimating the true effects of these institutions.
Second, in order to avoid atypical years, it is common practice to construct the fiscal
variables as averages of a delimited period of time. Using WDI will imply going
earlier than 1999 which will aggravate the problem mentioned above. WEO data,
by the contrary, contains more detailed fiscal variables and is reasonably available up
to 2003. A potential problem with WEO data is that it is not periodically revised.
For these reasons I had no choice but to use WEO data. All fiscal outcome variables
were constructed as averages of the period 1999-2003.
All the remaining economic and population variables are directly extracted,
or constructed from, WDI. The political variables are from the Database of Polit-
ical Institutions (DPI2004) by Philip Keefer (District Magnitude and Number of
Effective Parliamentary Parties), and from The Economist (Cabinet Size).
The empirical strategy is to fit the following benchmark model:
FO = β0+β1NumericalRules+β2Hierarchical+β3Transparency+~β′X+ε, (3.1)
where FO, that stands for Fiscal Outcomes, can alternatively take the form of Gen-
eral Revenues, General Expenditures, General Balance, Central Balance, General
Net Debt, and General Gross Debt, all expressed as ratios to GDP and, as was men-
tioned earlier, averaged over the 1999-2003 period. NumericalRules, Hierarchical,
and Transparency are the computed institutional indexes that were described in
the previous section. X is a vector of economic and demographic control variables
that can potentially influence fiscal outcomes. The controls are, first, the average
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growth of GDP for the 1990-2003 period (Avg. Growth) which is believed to be
directly related to revenues due to the progressivity of the tax structure and higher
tax revenues from job creation, and inversely (or neutrally) related to expenditures,
due to lower unemployment benefits paid by the state. Together, these effects should
also have a positive effect on fiscal balances and a negative effect on public debt.
Second, the Dependency Ratio, defined as the sum of population under 12 and over
65, divided by total population and averaged over the 1999-2003 period, is expected
to have the opposite effects to Avg. Growth on fiscal outcomes since a higher depen-
dency ratio represents a lower taxable base on one hand, and higher expenditure on
education and in the pension system, other things being equal. The third variable
(Wagner) is the average GDP per capita over the 1999-2003 period, measured in
dollars and adjusted by PPP, that is used as a proxy for the country’s develop-
ment level. This variable controls for Wagner’s law, the prediction for a positive
correlation between the development level of an economy and it’s share of public
expenditure to GDP. The last control is the degree of openness of an economy, de-
fined as the ratio of the sum of total exports and total imports to GDP (Openness).
This variable is included to account for the empirical finding (Rodrik (1996)) that
more open economies tend to have larger levels of government. I have also included
the value of the dependent variable in 1990 as a control for the evolution of the
analyzed fiscal outcome during the last decade; the intuition comes from the general
agreement that changes in fiscal institutions have occurred more dramatically since
1990.
The benchmark results for General Revenues, General Expenditures, and Cen-
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tral Balance, are presented in table 3.2, and results for General Balance, General Net
Debt, and and General Gross Debt in table 3.3. For each fiscal outcome, the model
with only the economic controls, is reported in the left columns, and the economic
controls and budgetary institutions in the right columns.
Looking at the models with the economic controls alone, there are three aspects
that are worth mentioning. First, in none of the six fiscal outcomes analyzed are
all of the economic controls significant at the same time, but nevertheless, we can
confidently reject the null of all coefficients being jointly equal to zero. Moreover,
every economic control enters significantly in at least half of the fiscal outcomes
analyzed. Second, the economic controls appear to do a better job on explaining
the fiscal outcomes reported on table 3.3 than on those of table 3.2. A possible
explanation is that debt and balance summarize the relationship between revenues
and expenditures, and so, effects that are not detected individually for the latter
can be captured in the former. Third, of the economic controls, the dependency
ratio appears to have the wrong sign for expenditures since the model would predict
that a higher ratio would imply a lower level of expenditures. Remarkably, once
budgetary institutions are introduced, this coefficient loses significance completely.2
According to Stein, Talvi and Grisanti (1999), the empirical literature on bud-
get institutions and fiscal performance has consistently found an impact of budget
2Dropping one control at a time and both of them didn’t change the significance level of any
of the other variables and the coefficient values were pretty much the same (never changed more
than 5%). Since there are good theoretical motives to suspect that the non-significant controls
truly affect fiscal outcomes they are left as part of the regression.
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institutions on fiscal deficits and debt, but has failed almost as consistently in find-
ing an association with government size. This assertion can be contrasted with the
results reported on tables 3.2 and 3.3 for the benchmark model. On one hand it
can be seen in both tables that budgetary institutions help to explain cross-country
differences in the fiscal balance, either at the central or general level, and of the
general gross debt. Moreover, in this case, it seems that budgetary institutions help
to explain cross-country differences in the size of government when looking at the
general level of expenditures. On the other hand, it can be seen that it is not bud-
getary institutions in general but only the level of transparency in the budgetary
process that matters in explaining cross-country differences in these fiscal outcomes.
The interpretation of the point estimates of Transparency is that an increase in
this variable of one standard deviation (0.12) from its midpoint (0.69) is associated
with a reduction of 2.3 percent on General Expenditures, with a fiscal stance im-
provement of 1.2 and 1.6 percent on the Central and General Balance, respectively,
and with a 12.4 percent reduction of the General Gross Debt, all these measures
relative to GDP.
In terms of the explained cross country variation, the inclusion of budgetary
institutions in the benchmark model improves considerably the R-squared of the
regressions in which Transparency enters significantly, particularly for both fiscal
balance and gross debt.
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Table 3.2: Benchmark Model.
General Revenues General Expenditures Central Balance
Dep. Var. 1990 0.343 0.383 0.298 0.323 0.084 0.077
(0.158)∗∗ (0.160)∗∗ (0.135)∗∗ (0.154)∗∗ (0.056) (0.082)
Avg. Growth -0.015 -0.015 -0.021 -0.014 0.007 0.006
(0.013) (0.016) (0.011)∗ (0.015) (0.005) (0.006)
Dependency Rat. -0.218 -0.211 -0.324 -0.229 0.094 0.042
(0.139) (0.159) (0.139)∗∗ (0.174) (0.060) (0.061)
Wagner 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.001)∗∗ (0.0015)∗∗ (0.0011) (.0014) (0.0005)∗∗∗ (0.0007)∗∗
Openness 0.059 0.075 0.028 0.035 0.023 0.019
(0.046) (0.050) (0.043) (0.054) (0.013)∗ (0.014)
Transparency -0.067 -0.194 0.106
(0.113) (0.109)∗ (0.050)∗∗
NumericalRules 0.062 -0.014 0.025
(0.069) (0.077) (0.028)
Hierarchical -0.025 -0.024 0.000
(.078) (.079) (.029)
Constant 0.305 0.304 0.453 0.534 -0.123 -0.173
(0.118)∗∗ (0.130)∗∗∗ (0.115)∗∗∗ (0.170)∗∗∗ (0.050)∗∗ (0.069)∗∗
R2 0.74 0.75 0.61 0.66 0.46 0.57
No. of Observations 37 37 37 37 36 36
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.∗∗∗ significant at 1%, ∗∗ significant at 5% and,
∗ significant at 10%.
3.3.2 Different Specifications for Numerical Rules
As was already mentioned, one can immediately suspect a wrong specification
of the numerical rules index employed above, since it gives the same weight to factors63
Table 3.3: Benchmark Model.
General Balance General Net Debt General Gross Debt
Dep. Var. 1990 0.204 0.242 0.799 0.793 0.779 0.753
(0.099)∗∗ (0.126)∗ (0.079)∗∗∗ (0.091)∗∗∗ (0.109)∗∗∗ (0.074)∗∗∗
Avg. Growth 0.005 -0.002 -0.116 -0.098 -0.122 -0.098
(0.006) (0.007) (7.026)∗∗∗ (0.037)∗∗ (0.027)∗∗∗ (0.022)∗∗∗
Dependency Rat. 0.102 0.016 -2.956 -2.766 -1.718 -1.150
(0.058)∗ (0.057) (0.696)∗∗∗ (0.860)∗∗∗ (0.554)∗∗∗ (0.396)∗∗∗
Wagner 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.004 0.000 0.001
(0.0006)∗∗∗ (0.0008)∗∗∗ (0.0036) (0.0043) (0.0028) (0.0027)
Openness 0.035 0.041 -0.227 -0.212 -0.266 -0.204
(0.016)∗∗ (0.018)∗∗ (0.113)∗ (0.142) (0.130)∗ (0.100)∗
Transparency 0.136 -0.454 -1.063
(0.068)∗ (0.333) (0.315)∗∗∗
NumericalRules 0.056 -0.009 0.057
(0.042) (0.206) (0.178)
Hierarchical 0.008 -0.107 -0.085
(0.037) (0.246) (0.156)
Constant -0.140 -0.216 2.022 2.296 1.439 1.826
(0.053)∗∗ (0.082)∗∗ (0.416)∗∗∗ (0.488)∗∗∗ (0.348)∗∗∗ (0.369)∗∗∗
R2 0.50 0.63 0.87 0.89 0.74 0.86
No. of Observations 37 37 26 26 30 30
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.∗∗∗ significant at 1%, ∗∗ significant at 5% and,
∗ significant at 10%.
that directly constrain the size of government and deficits, and to those that can
affect them indirectly. The other two proposed specifications for Numerical Rules
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are presented in table 3.4, where I have omitted to report the control variables.
NumericalRules 2 gives half of the weight to direct restrictions on the budget and
the other half to between and within restrictions. NumericalRules 3 takes into
account only direct restrictions. As can be seen, the lack of significance of the
numerical rules index is not due to its specification. The Transparency measure, is
not affected by these changes in specification.
Table 3.4: Benchmark Model: Different Numerical Rules.
General General Central General General General
Revenues Expenditures Balance Balance Net Debt Gross Debt
Transparency -.0622 -.1881 .1062 .1324 -.4574 -1.078
(.1120) (.1108) (.0507)∗∗ (.0722)∗ (.3078) (.3191)∗∗∗
NumericalRules 2 .0647 .0246 .0057 .0283 -.0208 .0156
(.0633) (.0703) (.0239) (.0361) (.1505) (.1273)
Hierarchical -.0315 -.0412 .0099 .0185 -.0993 -.0733
(.0754) (.0788) (.0283) (.0366) (.2494) (.1447)
R2 0.75 0.66 0.56 0.61 0.89 0.86
General General Central General General General
Revenues Expenditures Balance Balance Net Debt Gross Debt
Transparency -.0643 -.1845 .1047 .1270 -.4544 -1.0848
(.1140) (.1077)∗ (.0501)∗∗ (.0725)∗ (.2963) (.3172)∗∗∗
NumericalRules 3 .0273 .0267 -.0105 -.0046 -.0120 -.0054
(.0377) (.0435) (.0168) (.0215) (.1034) (.0892)
Hierarchical -.0179 -.0465 .0220 .0370 -.0989 -.0646
(.0751) (.0793) (.0300) (.0401) (.2540) (.1357)
R2 0.74 0.66 0.57 0.60 0.89 0.86
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.∗∗∗ significant at 1%, ∗∗ significant at 5% and,
∗ significant at 10%.
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3.3.3 Budgetary Institutions and Development
In the benchmark model I have tried to account for all sources of heterogene-
ity, even the development level of a country. But if the degree of development is
correlated with budgetary institutions but it is not—or in a different way—with the
measures of budgetary institutions, the results obtained above will be inexorably
biased. Suppose, for example, that the punishment for a policymaker that is caught
cheating is more severe in a rich than in a poor country. Then, it will be expected
that the same degree of transparency will exert a higher influence on fiscal outcomes
in rich than in poor countries, something that the transparency index will not cap-
ture. In trying to account for this possibility I divided the data set into rich and
poor countries, using the original OECD as rich countries, and ran the same set
of regressions to see if the estimated parameters are stable to sample specification.
The results are reported in table 3.5.
The Hierarchical index appears to be marginally important amongst less devel-
oped countries for General Revenues. This relationship is not robust. By dropping
one economic control at a time, the coefficient loses significance when the Wagner
effect or openness are not part of the regression whereas the estimate gains signifi-
cance if growth or the dependency ratio are left out.
Additionally, in the Gross Debt specification for less developed countries, Nu-
mericalRules enters significantly but with the opposite sign of what is expected.
Dropping one economic control at a time does not destroy this result except when
growth is left out. A possible interpretation of this result is that less developed coun-
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Table 3.5: Rich vs. Poor Countries.
Rich Countries General General Central General General General
Revenues Expenditures Balance Balance Net Debt Gross Debt
Transparency .0681 -.2141 .1843 .1806 -1.356 -1.3134
(.1399) (.0801)∗∗ (.0874)∗ (.0949)∗ (.3013)∗∗∗ (.5184)∗∗
NumericalRules .0158 -.0179 -.0040 .0144 .04193 .0956
(.0689) (.0486) (.0526) (.0538) (.2198) (.3687)
Hierarchical .1183 .1029 .0680 .0699 -.2106 .1137
(.0919) (.0855) (.0882) (.0948) (.4007) (.3974)
R2 0.87 0.88 0.64 0.57 0.95 0.86
No. of Observations 18 18 17 18 17 18
Poor Countries General General Central General General General
Revenues Expenditures Balance Balance Net Debt Gross Debt
Transparency -.0950 -.2248 .1017 .1242 – -.5812
(.0908) (.1598) (.0840) (.1142) (.3770)
NumericalRules .0619 -.0477 .0507 .1172 – .9301
(.0615) (.1257) (.0695) (.0971) (.3600)∗
Hierarchical -.1245 -.1140 -.0162 -.0234 – -.5262
(.0587)∗ (.0929) (.0461) (.0521) (.3325)
R2 0.87 0.73 0.49 0.50 – 0.96
No. of Observations 19 19 19 19 9 12
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.∗∗∗ significant at 1%, ∗∗ significant at 5% and,
∗ significant at 10%.
tries typically face credit constraints from the private sector which can be softened
if balanced budget rules are in place. Of course, this or any other interpretation
should be taken with caution given the small sample size.3
3I also employed the other two definitions of NumericalRules and while the results are preserved
for the intermediate specification(NumericalRules 2 ), the coefficient loses all significance for the
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Looking at the regressions for the sub-sample of rich countries, we can see
that the results for Transparency, NumericalRules, and Hierarchical are preserved.
Moreover, Transparency enters significantly in the Net Debt regression once the less
developed countries are left out. This suggests that Transparency being the only
budgetary institution that matters in the whole sample, for most fiscal outcomes,
is basically driven by rich countries; the inclusion of less developed countries do
not destroy this relationship. Given that I have controlled for economic differences
across countries and that splitting an already small sample is very costly in terms of
degrees of freedom, I have chosen to continue with the whole sample. Nevertheless,
the results presented so far in this section help to understand discrepancies in the
literature of budgetary institutions and fiscal outcomes. For example, the Latin
American experience, composed of all under-developed countries, was documented
by Alesina et al (1999), and Filc and Scartascini (2004) who found that only numer-
ical constraints and hierarchical procedures motives are important in determining
fiscal outcomes.
3.3.4 Political Controls
So far, I have analyzed the effects of budgetary institutions on fiscal outcomes
taking account of economic variables that have been shown to influence fiscal policy.
Here, I add to the model a variety of political variables that have also been shown to
be correlated with fiscal outcomes. All of these political variables capture, one way
or another, the idea of fragmented government. Government fragmentation arises
more strict one (NumericalRules 3 ).
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when several agents or groups participate in the fiscal decision-making process, each
with its own interest and constituencies to satisfy, and each with some weight in
the final decision. To participate in the majority, each group demands a share in
the budget; as all groups do this, the end result is a high level of expenditure or a
large deficit (Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999)). In other words, fragmentation is an
expression of a common pool problem.
First, I add to the model a measure of district magnitude, defined as the
average number of representatives elected per district to the Lower House. Several
theoretical and empirical studies show that, other things being equal, the degree of
government fragmentation increases with the number of political parties. In turn,
the number of political parties increases with district magnitude. Consequently,
one should expect the common pool problem to be enhanced as average district
magnitude augment.
The second variable of consideration is the effective number of parliamentary
or legislative parties(ENPP), defined by the Laakso and Taagepera (1979) formula,
1/
∑
s2i , where si is the percentage of seats won by the i
th party. While district
magnitude is a direct characteristic of the electoral system, its effect on fiscal policy
is expected to go through outcomes of the electoral system as, in this case, the ENPP.
A larger ENPP represents a more fragmented government and thus, countries with
a higher ENPP are expected to have larger governments, to be more indebted, and
to run larger deficits.
Following Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999), the third variable under consider-
ation is the cabinet size, defined as the sum of all spending ministers. While this
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variable does not reflect government fragmentation per se, it is related to the idea of
more decision-makers wanting to maximize their share of the budget; in this case,
from the executive side of the budgeting process. In other words, it is expected that
more numerous cabinets will tend to be associated with bigger governments and
larger deficits.
Finally, I control for the degree of income inequality using the Gini coeffi-
cient.4 The idea for including it is that, if agents are altruistic, they will care for
their descendants and thus the current generation of taxpayers will refrain from re-
distributing wealth from future generations of taxpayers by contracting public debt.
Cuckierman and Meltzer (1989) as well as Tabellini (1991) have pointed out that this
altruistic effect becomes weaker the higher the income inequality, and consequently
higher levels of public debt should be expected.5
In table 3.6 I present the regression results of including these political controls.
I first proceed to estimate each equation including all three budgetary institutions,
but in no case were either NumericalRules or Hierarchical significant. I re-estimated
all regressions dropping these variables in order to gain a couple of degrees of freedom
and to avoid a problem of possible multi-collinearity since the Hierarchical index
and the political variables are trying to capture the same effect. Since none of the
estimated coefficients changed qualitatively from one specification to the other, I
4Although inequality is not a political variable, it is not commonly used in the budgetary
institutions literature so I decided to use it as an additional control rather than in the benchmark
model
5See Feld and Kirchgassner (1999) for a complete elaboration of this idea.
70
report the latter, omitting once again the results of the other controls.
District Magnitude does not seem to affect fiscal outcomes and the only time
it enters a regression significantly it has the wrong sign. The lack of District Magni-
tude’s explanatory power is consistent with the results of Stein, Talvi and Grisanti
(1999) on a sample of Latin American countries. The reason for this outcome, as
mentioned above, could be due to District Magnitude affecting fiscal outcomes only
indirectly, and that this effect is either too low or that it fails to show up in this
short and static data set.
The Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties enters in all regressions with
the expected sign and is significant for General Revenues, General Expenditures
and General Gross Debt. The better performance of ENPP compared with District
Magnitude is exactly what was expected since ENPP is a direct measure of the
common pool effect.
The Cabinet Size variable enters in the set of regressions changing signs but
the only time it enters significantly it does so with the expected one. Overall Cab-
inet Size does not seem to play an important role on conditioning fiscal outcomes,
contrary to the finding by Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) on a sample OECD coun-
tries. In a second reading of their result though, they report that Cabinet Size effect
seems to have been washed out during the nineties and dominated by the legisla-
tive side of the common pool problem. These results are consistent with the ones
presented here, where ENPP is more important than Cabinet Size.
The Gini coefficient enters significantly in the General Revenue, General Ex-
penditures and General Net Debt regressions. As mentioned above, the only im-
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plied relationship from theory was that more inequality should be paired with more
indebtedness due to a decrease in the bequest motive of an altruistic agent. In
principle, the relation of inequality to revenues and expenditures could take any
direction and still be consistent with a positive association to public debt. In this
case, the negative sign in both coefficients can be interpreted as the tax rate not
being progressive enough so higher levels of inequality will bring less government
revenues and, other things being equal, less expenditures.
Finally, and more importantly, Transparency remains very robust to the in-
clusion of the political controls and the Gini coefficient. The only instance in which
Transparency loses explanatory power is for Central and General Balance after the
inclusion of Cabinet Size. This result is not driven by the the countries included in
the regression since re estimating the benchmark model using only the data points
for which Cabinet Size is available, still yielded levels of significance equivalent to
those when the full sample was employed. What drives this result is the fact that
Cabinet Size and Transparency are highly and positively correlated (0.43) at a .02
significance level. This partial collinearity problem has the effect of dampening their
significance levels when both variables are included. Why Transparency and Cabi-
net Size are correlated is a question that is not treated here but that surely needs
further exploration; there is no a priori reason to think the former causes the first
which would have resulted in Cabinet Size being the true underling force. For clar-
ification purposes, it’s worth mentioning that Transparency is not correlated with
any of the other control variables.
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3.4 Index Aggregation and Substitutability
The results from the econometric analysis establish that the constructed mea-
sures of transparency are correlated with fiscal outcomes, but that the numerical
rules and hierarchical indexes are not. I now turn to the sensitivity of these results
to the questions that form each index. This exercise gains relevance in the fact
that every study that measures budgetary institutions through indexes employs a
different information set.
In table 3.7 I present the results for the sensitivity of transparency in Gross
Debt. The information set for transparency are the fourteen question mentioned
earlier. The first row of the table indicates the number of questions utilized in
the construction of a transparency index. The second row indicates the number of
possible indices that can be constructed given the information set and a fixed number
of questions. For example, there are 2002 ways of choosing 5 questions from a set
of 14. The third to fifth rows indicate, respectively, the percentage of cases, from
the whole set of combinations, of obtaining a significant negative, an insignificant
positive, and a significant positive relationship between transparency and gross debt,
using the benchmark model with the original controls. For example, the Alesina et
al (1999) transparency measure is made of two questions. By randomly choosing
two questions out of 14, I have a 0.44 probability of obtaining a negative (and
significant) relationship between transparency and gross debt in the benchmark
model. Choosing 7 out of 14 questions elevates that probability to 0.84. There
are three main things that can be said from the table. First, the more questions
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included in the determination of the index, the more likely it would be to find a
significant negative relationship between transparency and gross debt. Second, that
there is no possible combination of questions that will give a positive and significant
relationship between these variables, something that reinforces the idea that the
true relationship is in fact negative. Lastly, in terms of significance, there is no
difference if the index is made of 11 or more questions.6
Does this means that one should stop at 11 questions? In general, the answer
is no, at least until one can determine which questions are good reflections of reality
and which ones diversions from it. Moreover, to put things in perspective, table 3.8
depicts the same exercise, but now between transparency and General Balance. It
is again true that indices obtained using more questions have a higher probability of
confirming the hypothesized relationship (positive in this case), but now the number
of questions included at the high end has an effect. From these observations, it could
be said that the assumption that these questions are perfect substitutes does not
hold.
The same exercise was performed for numerical rules and hierarchical proce-
dures (see the appendix for these tables). In general terms it can be said that the
lack of significance of these two institutional measures were not driven by the num-
ber of questions included. The only puzzling result is that when some significance
was found, either in the hypothesized direction or contrary to it, these occurred for
indices that contained a relatively low number of questions.
6The significance threshold is set to be at most 10%.
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3.5 Testing for an Interaction Effect between Transparency and Nu-
merical Rules
Lastly, I analyze the possibility of conditional numerical constraints. The
consistent failure of finding any significant relationship between the different mea-
sures of numerical constraints and fiscal outcomes may be due to the impossibility
of enforcing those constraints. Specifically, if the budgetary process is sufficiently
opaque, it would be hard for the constituents to detect any deviation from the rule,
and therefore the constraints might not bind. There are, at least, two empirical
strategies to test for conditional numerical constraints. The first consists of divid-
ing the data set between transparent and non transparent countries and running
the same set of regressions in both sub-samples. One should expect to obtain a
significant coefficient for NumericalRules in the transparent sub sample and still a
non-significant one for the opaque set of countries. The advantage of dividing the
sample is a straightforward interpretation of the test since, provided that Trans-
parency is exogenous and independent, one is comparing two sets of countries that
will only differ in their transparency level. Of course this comes at the high cost
of dropping a lot of observations which in a small cross-section like this one might
turn out to be prohibitive. I tried this strategy, separating the data set in two
halves, but I did not find any significant coefficient for NumericalRules in any of its
specifications, either in the high or low Transparency group.
The second strategy is to take advantage of the whole data set and test for an
interaction effect between Transparency and NumericalRules directly. The short-
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coming of including an interaction effect in the model resides in its’ interpretability
since the model loses its additivity. Moreover, it is not clear that an interacted vari-
able, like the one constructed by multiplying Transparency and NumericalRules,
will capture the true relationship between these variables. The interaction assumes
a continuous relationship between the two constituent variables, though it is plau-
sible that a minimum level of transparency is required for numerical constraints
to become binding. This effect might not be captured by a standard interaction
model. To investigate this possibility I follow two approaches: First, I evaluate a
standard interaction model and then multiply the NumericalRules measures with a
dummy variable that separates countries by their Transparency level with the aim
of capturing any discontinuity in this interaction.
3.5.1 The interaction model
To test for relevant interactions I add to the benchmark specification an inter-
action variable, Interaction that is the product of Transparency and NumericalRules ;
the two constituent variables that need to be present in the regression.
FO = β0+β1NumericalRules+β2Hierarchical+β3Transparency+β4Interaction+~β′X+ε,
(3.2)
The p-value provided for the t-test indicates the level of significance of the
product term. Only if the product term is significant can one conclude that the hy-
pothesized interaction actually exists in the data. The only fiscal outcome for which
I obtained a significant Interaction is General Balance; thus one can confidently say
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that there is no interaction effect for the rest.
With respect to General Balance things are somewhat different. Table 3.9
shows that an interaction effect is present but, surprisingly, of opposite sign than
expected. For comparison, the first column reports the coefficients, robust standard
errors and significance level for Transparency and NumericalRules in the additive
model (controls and Hierarchical coefficients are not reported) where, as was already
mentioned, only Transparency enters significantly. The second column reports the
coefficients for the institutional variables and their interaction which is significant
at a .05 level, but that indicates that as Transparency (NumericalRules) increases,
NumericalRules (Transparency) tends to reduce the General Balance.
One would be tempted to conclude that the inclusion of the interaction vari-
able helps to disentangle the true effect of Transparency and, specially, Numer-
icalRules since now the latter appears with a significant and positive coefficient,
and the explained variation of the dependent variable improves considerably go-
ing from an R-squared of 0.63 to an R-squared of 0.70. Even Transparency ap-
pear to gain statistical significance and economic importance. The problem, of
course, is that the model is no longer additive and therefore the interpretation
of the coefficients attached to the constituent variables have changed: Now they
represent the influence of NumericalRules (Transparency) on the General Balance
when Transparency (NumericalRules) is equal to zero, which by itself has no eco-
nomic interpretation, considering that the minimum value for Transparency and
NumericalRules are 0.39 and 0.14, respectively. The only valid interpretation for
any of the constituent variables is, in this case, to consider their total condi-
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tional effect. According to equation (2), the total effect of NumericalRules on the
General Balance is given by β̂1 + β̂4Transparency, with a robust standard error
of equal to:
√
[ ˆvarβ1 + 2(Transparency) ˆcovβ1,β4 + (Transparency)2 ˆvarβ4 ], where
ˆvarβ1 is the variance of the NumericalRules, ˆvarβ4 is the variance of the Interaction
coefficient, and ˆcovβ1,β4 is the covariance of the two. Similar statistics were com-
puted for the Transparency conditional on NumericalRules. It is common practice
to pick meaningful values of the constituent variables to analyze the conditional to-
tal effects. Here, I have chosen the average value and one standard deviations from
it. Table 3.10 shows the conditional effects of Transparency and NumericalRules on
the General Balance.
The effect of Transparency on the fiscal balance, conditional on Numerical-
Rules is always positive, the effect decreases with NumericalRules and loses signif-
icance for high levels of NumericalRules. The effect of the NumericalRules condi-
tional on Transparency is indeed puzzling, since it goes in the opposite direction
of what was postulated in the previous chapter. NumericalRules appears to have
a positive and significant effect on the fiscal balance only for low levels of Trans-
parency, which is certainly discouraging in terms of the model presented in the
earlier. However, this empirical outcome should be taken with extreme care since it
might not be a general result. First, there is evidence of an interaction effect only for
General Balance but not for the remaining fiscal outcomes. Second, the interaction
effect found in the benchmark model is very sensitive to model specification, since
by dropping some of the benchmark controls or adding some of the political controls
the interaction effect disappears. Third, when the measure of numerical constraints
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is NumericalRules 2, the interaction term is only significant at 0.10 and disappears
when NumericalRules 3 is used as measure of numerical constraints. Finally, the
last incongruence of this result has do to with the test of a discontinuous effect to
which now we turn.
3.5.2 Testing for a Discontinuous Effect
Table 3.9 also reports the possibility of a discontinuous or cut off value of
Transparency for NumericalRules to be binding. The conjecture is that the numer-
ical constraint variable interacted with a dummy is going to be significant, in the
same direction as transparency, and further that the interaction with NumRule X
Third will be stronger than with NumRule X Half.
The results in columns three and four tell us that the NumericalRules effect of
the top half most transparent countries is indistinguishable from the bottom half, but
that if we compare the top third of most transparent countries with the remaining
countries, there exists a distinguishable effect, although of the opposite direction of
what was hypothesized. The negative sign in front of NumRule X Third is similar
to the negative interaction in the model above. The coefficient of NumRule X Third
tells us the marginal effect of NumericalRules of the most transparent countries.
Hence, the total effect for these countries is that numerical constraints actually
decrease the General Balance (0.055-0.100), something that was not picked up by
the interaction model. Once again, General Balance was the only fiscal outcome for
which a discontinuous effect could be found.
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3.6 Concluding Remarks
I use a new survey on budgetary practices, with the broadest country coverage
so far, to construct several measures of the different budgetary institutions recog-
nized in the literature: numerical constraints, procedural rules, and transparency.
The results for the whole sample of countries indicate that not all budgetary
institutions affect fiscal outcomes in the same manner. In particular, only the level of
transparency shows a significant and economically important effect on Central and
General Deficits, as well as on General Debt. On the contrary, numerical constraints
and procedural rules fail to show any significant effect on fiscal outcomes. These
results, however, are not independent of the country’s level of economic development.
In particular, the results are reinforced for the richest countries but none of the
budgetary institutions enters significantly for less developed economies.
To the question of perfect substitutability between different components of
the budgetary process, I provide evidence that the constructed indexes are very
sensitive to the information included. This suggests that the results obtained here
and elsewhere should be taken as preliminary until we have a better way to define
these institutions.
Finally, contrary to what was postulated in the previous chapter, for this sam-
ple of countries it does not seem to exist an interaction effect between transparency
and numerical constraints.
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Table 3.6: Political Controls.
General General Central General General General
Revenues Expenditures Balance Balance Net Debt Gross Debt
Transparency -.0643 -.1824 .1059 .1242 -1.0397 -1.0765
(.1122) (.1024)∗ (.0489)∗∗ (.0687)∗ (.2213)∗∗∗ (.3336)∗∗∗
District Magnitude -.0002 -.0001 -.0000 -.00007 -.0007 -.0018
(.0002) (.0003) (.0001) (.0001) (.0005) (.0004)∗∗∗
R2 0.748 0.659 .561 .590 .942 .889
No. of Observations 37 37 36 37 23 25
Transparency -.1167 -.2589 .1183 .1456 -.9721 -1.194
(.1109) (.0890)∗∗∗ (.0552)∗∗ (.0788)∗ (.2073)∗∗∗ (.3381)∗∗∗
ENPP .0178 .0186 -.0001 -.0004 .0200 .0350
(.0073)∗∗ (.0072)∗∗∗ (.0029) (.0032) (.0155) (.0182)∗
R2 .758 0.695 .572 .603 .938 .883
No. of Observations 34 34 33 34 24 24
Transparency -.1941 -.2800 .0982 .1288 -.9422 -1.437
(.1116)∗ (.1275)∗∗ (.0855) (.1105) (.2453)∗∗∗ (.2850)∗∗∗
Cabinet Size .0016 -.0029 .0016 .0016 -.0071 .0189
(.0031) (.0034) (.0024) (.0023) (0101) (.0084)∗∗
R2 0.826 0.784 .574 .604 .941 .887
No. of Observations 30 30 30 30 23 23
Transparency -.0196 -.1884 .1260 .1517 -.6676 -1.266
(.1040) (.0850)∗∗ (.0543)∗∗ (.0793)∗ (.2625)∗∗ (.2780)∗∗∗
Gini Coefficient -.0080 -.0068 -.0008 -.0004 .0105 .0088
(.0021)∗∗∗ (.0016)∗∗∗ (.0012) (.0012) (.0040)∗∗ (.0052)
R2 .825 .765 .580 .605 .914 .879
No. of Observations 33 33 32 33 25 24
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.∗∗∗ significant at 1%, ∗∗ significant at 5% and,
∗ significant at 10%.
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Table 3.7: Different Transparency Indexes on Gross Debt.
Number of Questions 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Combinations 91 364 1001 2002 3003 3432 3003 2002 1001 364 91 14 1
% cases (-) sig. 44 46 61 68 77 84 91 96 98 100 100 100 100
% cases (+) 12 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
% cases (+) sig. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3.8: Different Transparency Indexes on General Balance.
Number of Questions 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Combinations 91 364 1001 2002 3003 3432 3003 2002 1001 364 91 14 1
% cases (+) sig. 11 16 19 23 26 30 34 39 45 51 58 77 100
% cases (-) 17 6 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
% cases (-) sig. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
82
Table 3.9: Different Model Specification for General Balance.
Benchmark Multiplicative Cut off: Half Cut off: Third
Transparency 0.136 0.440 0.207 0.306
(0.068)∗ (0.160)∗∗∗ (0.115)∗ (0.090)∗∗∗
NumericalRules 0.056 0.431 0.064 0.055
(0.042) (0.177)∗∗ (0.041) (0.030)∗
Interaction -0.583
(0.253)∗∗
NumRule X Half -0.039
(0.039)
NumRule X Third -.100
(0.032)∗∗∗
R2 0.63 0.70 0.65 0.75
No. of Observations 37 37 37 37
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.∗∗∗ significant at 1%, ∗∗ significant at 5% and,
∗ significant at 10%.
Table 3.10: Conditional Effects on General Balance.
Numerical Rules Transparency
Low Average High Low Average High
Transparency 0.260 0.146 0.032 — — —
(0.089)∗∗∗ (0.056)∗∗ (0.057)
NumericalRules — — — 0.100 0.032 -0.035
(0.042)∗∗ (0.028) (0.039)
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.∗∗∗ significant at 1%, ∗∗ significant at 5% and,
∗ significant at 10%.
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Chapter 4
Fiscal Transparency in the American States: A Re-Examination
4.1 Introduction
This chapter is almost entirely focused on the relation between budgetary
transparency and fiscal outcomes, with the difference that in this case the object
of study consists of the American states, instead of a group of countries as in the
previous chapter. The biggest advantage of restricting the study of budgetary trans-
parency to a sub-national level is that so doing eliminates factors that are inherent
to every country and which are difficult to control, such as political structures,
language, etc, but are essentially the same among the American states.
The first part of the chapter builds upon the work of Alt, Lassen and Skilling
(2003) (ALS), who have analyzed the effect of budgetary transparency on govern-
ment size. To do so, ALS constructed an index of fiscal transparency reflecting
the state of this institution by the end of the nineties. ALS found the novel result
that there is a positive correlation between transparency and government size. This
result follows from the intuitive argument that voters across American states are
willing to sacrifice private consumption for a greater share of public goods, provided
they have a better idea of how these resources are actually spent. Note, however,
that this necessarily implies an under-provision of public goods.
In this chapter I construct an index similar to the ALS index, with the added
84
advantage that the measurement spans the period 1985 to 2002. This allows me
to observe the evolution of transparency starting from the mid-eighties, and thus,
evaluate the impact of this evolution on fiscal outcomes.
In the second part of this chapter I compare the aforementioned longitudinal
transparency index with a new index calculated by Alt, Lassen and Rose (2005)
(ALR) that spans the years 1972 to 2002. Both indices share a common source,
which leads to the expectation that the measurements should be identical if we
focus on the common source and time span. However, it will be shown this is not
so because, even if the sources are the same, information gathered differs in time.
The main result of the chapter is that the ALS measure of transparency must
be necessarily biased because it ignores state fixed effects. If these effects are taken
into account, the effect of fiscal transparency on government size is significantly
reduced, although not to the point of rendering it statistically and economically
insignificant.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In the second section I compare
the cross-sectional index computed by ALS with the longitudinal index obtained
here. The third section presents empirical results obtained using the new index. In
the fourth section I compare my index with the longitudinal ALR index. In section
five I establish the connection between the results obtained here and in the previous
chapter, followed by the concluding remarks.
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4.2 Fiscal transparency among the American States: A comparison
ALS were the first authors to provide a measure of fiscal transparency among
American states. These authors constructed an index that captures characteristic
features of the budgetary process of every state that make it more or less transparent.
ALS obtained their data from the 1995 and 1999 surveys on Budget Processes in the
States, published by the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO),
and from the 1998 Legislative Budget Procedures survey, published by the National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCOSL). ALS identify 9 key points associated
with fiscal transparency, which are listed below according to their source:
NASBO Source:
1. Is the budget reported on a GAAP (generally accepted accounting practice)
basis? (Yes = more transparent, if shared language facilitates communication).
2. Are there multi-year expenditure forecasts? (Yes = more transparent, since
more information about plans and the expected consequences of action is dis-
seminated).
3. Frequency of budget cycle (Annual = more transparent than biennial, since
more frequency means more (frequent) information).
4. Are the revenue estimates binding? (Yes = more transparent, since estimates
that are binding increases the costliness of misleading).
5. Does the executive branch have primary responsibility for the revenue fore-
cast? (No = more transparent, if it is likely to be misleading or manipulative).
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6. Does the budget include performance measures and are they published (Yes
= more transparent, if these create a more explicit and therefore shareable
standards for judging).
NCOSL Source:
7. Are there multiple appropriations bills? (No = more transparent, if a single
location facilitates monitoring).
8. Does a non-partisan staff write Appropriations bills? (Yes = more trans-
parent, again implying less incentive to manipulate).
9. Can the legislature pass open-ended appropriations? (No = more trans-
parent, if this means that published figures are closer to ultimate outturns).
The extent to which these questions are indeed related to budgetary trans-
parency is open to debate, and although a deeper discussion goes beyond the scope
of this work, I will return to this point later on to address it, albeit superficially. Re-
grettably, ALS fail to provide transparency in their own analysis by omitting scores
according to State of each of their key questions numbered above, nor do they report
the level of the index. In addition, they do not explain how they combined the data
from the NASBO surveys given that various states report different practices in 1995
and 1999, and they wrap up by stating that, unfortunately “no historical time-series
is available”.
In this chapter I provide a dynamical measure of fiscal transparency, similar
to the one given by ALS but extended through time. The NCOSL survey does not
87
help in this regard given that it only exists for 1998, but NASBO surveys have been
taken roughly every two or three years starting in 1977. As can be seen from the
list of questions used by ALS, most of the information contained by the index stems
from the NASBO surveys, and this means that even if some relevant information can
be lost it’s worthwhile to analyze the evolution of fiscal transparency approximated
by the sub-set of characteristics monitored by the NASBO surveys of 1977, 1981,
1987, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2002. Not surprisingly, the NASBO survey
itself has also changed through the years. The six characteristics of interest are
consistently reported without interruption starting with the 1987 survey, which is
why the first two surveys will be ignored herein.1 Table 4.1 shows the value of the
index per state and per survey. The index ranges from a maximum value of 6 and
a minimum value of zero.
Three things become readily apparent. First, the high variability of the index
among States is clear, in accordance with the results obtained by ALS, even if we
are focused on a subset of the original ALS index conditions. Second, while the
index value seems to be highly persistent, it does show time variability which is
not necessarily trending upwards, that is, reflecting more transparent institutions.
Finally, it would appear that, starting in the late eighties and all the way through the
mid nineties, American states adopted less transparent budgetary practices. This
trend is reversed at the end of the nineties and continues all the way through 2002.
1The information relevant to binding is only available starting in 1992. However, there is data
starting in 1989 about who checks these estimates. Thus, binding is set equal to 1 in 1989 given
it was reported as equal to 1 in 1992. Likewise, the 1987 value is taken from the 1989 value.
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Table 4.1: Transparency Score for the American States 1987-2002.
1987 1989 1992 1995 1997 1999 2002
Alabama 2 4 4 4 4 3 3
Alaska 0 2 3 3 3 3 3
Arizona 3 2 4 2 2 2 2
Arkansas 4 4 3 3 3 3 3
California 3 4 3 3 3 3 2
Colorado 5 4 3 3 3 4 4
Connecticut 5 5 4 4 4 3 3
Delaware 3 4 3 5 5 5 5
Florida 5 2 2 2 3 3 3
Georgia 4 4 4 4 4 5 5
Hawaii 3 2 3 3 3 3 3
Idaho 2 3 4 4 3 3 4
Illinois 4 3 3 3 3 3 4
Indiana 1 2 0 0 1 2 2
Iowa 3 4 4 5 5 5 5
Kansas 4 3 3 2 2 2 2
Kentucky 1 1 2 2 2 3 3
Louisiana 4 3 3 4 4 4 4
Maine 3 2 3 3 4 3 3
Maryland 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Massachusetts 3 2 2 5 5 5 5
Michigan 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Minnesota 4 3 3 3 3 3 3
Mississippi 2 1 3 4 5 5 5
Missouri 3 3 3 2 2 2 2
Montana 2 4 2 2 2 2 2
Nebraska 2 2 2 2 3 3 3
Nevada 3 4 3 2 2 3 3
New Hampshire 5 2 3 3 3 3 3
New Jersey 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
New Mexico 3 2 1 1 1 2 3
New York 5 6 4 4 4 4 4
North Carolina 2 4 4 4 4 4 4
North Dakota 2 2 3 2 2 1 1
Ohio 2 1 0 1 3 3 2
Oklahoma 3 4 3 3 3 3 4
Oregon 2 4 3 3 3 3 3
Pennsylvania 4 4 4 5 5 5 5
Rhode Island 5 6 5 5 5 5 5
South Carolina 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
South Dakota 3 3 4 4 4 5 5
Tennessee 3 2 2 2 2 2 3
Texas 3 4 2 2 2 2 2
Utah 4 5 4 5 5 5 6
Vermont 2 2 3 3 3 3 3
Virginia 3 2 2 2 3 3 2
Washington 2 2 2 2 3 3 3
West Virginia 5 2 2 3 3 4 4
Wisconsin 2 1 0 0 2 2 3
Wyoming 1 2 1 2 2 2 2
Minimum 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
Maximum 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Average 3.06 3.06 2.88 3.02 3.22 3.30 3.38
Standard Deviation 1.33 1.33 1.22 1.33 1.17 1.15 1.19
Total 153 153 144 151 161 165 169
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Table 4.2: Transparency Score by Question.
1987 1989 1992 1995 1997 1999 2002
GAAP 18 13 14 18 19 18 20
Forecast 24 28 25 26 26 30 32
Frequency 28 32 30 27 27 27 27
Binding 23 23 26 27 29 30 30
Responsibility 30 21 14 14 15 15 16
Performance 30 36 35 39 45 44 44
Total 153 153 144 151 161 164 169
This u-shaped effect can essentially be explained by two factors that are ap-
parent in table 4.2. In the first place, the elevated score of the budget reflecting
GAAP practices in 1987 suggests an error during that year given the high cost in-
curred in changing from one accounting system to another. It’s also possible this
could be due to a re-definition of the meaning of the GAAP, but there’s no way to
test this possibility. The main factor, however, is that a total of 16 states seem to
have suffered a strong reversal, from 1987 to 1989 and 1989 to 1992, of the legisla-
ture involvement in the elaboration and revision of state income estimates. With
the exception of these two episodes, it can be argued that American states have, in
general, moved towards greater transparency.
Before analyzing the effect of budgetary transparency, measured by the tempo-
ral index presented above, it is vital to discern how much of the variability reported
by ALS is contained by the subset of 6 key points used to construct the temporal in-
dex. Table 4.3 reports the results obtained from making this comparison. The table
is divided into four quadrants, one for each dependent variable. The first column of
each quadrant corresponds to the ALS results, the second column lists the results
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obtained by replicating exactly the ALS procedure, and the third column shows the
results obtained by re-defining or approximating fiscal transparency using only the
six questions for which answers are available as a function of time. Data sources
are: Several issues of the Statistical Abstract of the United States, for economic and
population variables; Berry et al (1998), for the Ideology Index; and Poterba and
Rueben (1999) for Revenue Limitations.
Comparing columns (1) and (2) of the three nominal variable quadrants, we see
that there is a very close match between the original ALS and the ones replicated
here, with almost identical levels in terms of the explained variability. Perhaps
the only worthy observation is that in every instance, the ALS point estimate is
higher than the value obtained in the replica. The apparent irrelevance of Revenue
Limitation on the original ALS equation for Nominal Total Spending is perplexing,
although it could simply be a typo. Likewise, the unemployment level across states is
not significant in any of the ALS estimates, but it does on my replica for the Nominal
per capita Total Spending and Total Revenues. Finally, the level of significance is
seen to be slightly less in the replicas of both Nominal per Capita Spending and
Nominal per Capita General Revenue. The fourth quadrant, which contains the
Real per Capita Total Spending as a dependent variable shows essentially the same
qualitative results—with the exception of unemployment, which is significant in the
replica exercises—but the ALS point estimates are smaller than the ones obtained
in the replicas. This is very likely due to a difference in the base year used, where
ALS probably chose a base year earlier than 1996, which is the base I chose.
Comparing columns (2) and (3) of every quadrant shows that the coefficient
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Table 4.3: Index Comparison vs. ALS.
Nominal pc General Spending Nominal pc Total Spending
ALS (9) Replica (9) Replica (6) ALS (9) Replica (9) Replica (6)
Transparency 76.43 62.61 57.76 97.26 77.47 65.72
(31.49)∗∗ (27.44)∗∗ (32.45)∗ (35.11)∗∗∗ (29.32)∗∗ ( 35.62)∗
Real pc Income -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.004 0.16 0.22
(0.03) (0.10) (0.10) (0.03) (0.16) (0.16)
Unemployment 12.55 38.74 38.69 54.85 96.15 96.85
(37.58) (34.51) (37.06) (43.25) (39.75)∗∗ (43.09)∗∗
Ideology Index 10.86 9.52 8.90 13.74 10.89 10.09
(2.37)∗∗∗ (2.29)∗∗∗ (2.47)∗∗∗ (2.92)∗∗∗ (2.56)∗∗∗ (2.85)∗∗∗
South -499.22 -441.63 -436.11 -608.02 -540.82 -533.65
(105.80)∗∗∗ (95.64)∗∗∗ (94.23)∗∗∗ (123.4)∗∗∗ (110.26)∗∗∗ (109.42)∗∗∗
Revenue Limitation -98.16 -215.40 -215.76 0.31 -313.28 -312.33
(139.20) (141.11) (135.91) (152.00) ( 154.27)∗∗ (152.51)∗∗
Constant 1915.08 1291.11 1338.46 1493.45 808.54 865.34
(427.90)∗∗∗ (342.98)∗∗∗ (346.32)∗∗∗ (357.30)∗∗∗ (417.01)∗ (432.86)∗
R2 0.49 0.47 0.44 0.56 0.55 0.51
Nominal pc General Revenue Real pc Total Spending
ALS (9) Replica (9) Replica (6) ALS (9) Replica (9) Replica (6)
Transparency 78.80 67.15 56.35 51.55 91.02 77.38
(38.70)∗∗ (33.91)∗ (38.33) (23.67)∗∗ (33.71)∗∗∗ (42.11)∗
Real pc Income -0.02 -.01 0.03 -0.01 0.17 0.26
(0.03) (0.1) (0.15) (0.02) (0.18) (0.18)
Unemployment 23.92 39.99 40.67 -1.90 108.60 118.40
(40.13) (37.32) (41.32) (25.31) (45.95)∗∗ (48.85)∗∗
Ideology Index 10.92 9.71 9.01 6.38 12.43 11.60
(2.39)∗∗∗ (2.52)∗∗∗ (2.75)∗∗∗ (1.68)∗∗∗ (2.97)∗∗∗ (3.26)∗∗∗
South -509.85 -459.61 -453.35 -304.77 -626.96 -625.94
(110.70)∗∗∗ (104.10)∗∗∗ (101.52)∗∗∗ (75.34)∗∗∗ (127.47)∗∗∗ (127.46)∗∗∗
Revenue Limitation -278.87 -259.76 -258.79 -87.41 -342.47 -362.72
(161.3)∗ ( 132.42)∗ (125.94)∗∗ (87.30) (169.06)∗∗ (175.81)∗∗
Constant 1892.74 1363.70 1412.75 1356.07 958.90 905.67
(452.8)∗∗∗ ( 354.03)∗∗∗ (355.63)∗∗∗ (283.90)∗∗∗ (484.12)∗ (514.97)∗
R2 0.45 0.43 0.39 0.43 0.55 0.51
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.∗∗∗ significant at 1%, ∗∗ significant at 5% and,
∗ significant at 10%.
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associated to the transparency index decreases. This indicates that the set of 3
questions from the NCOSL source that were eliminated from the analysis are more
strongly correlated positively than the six questions used to obtain the new index.
To make this precise, a 10% increase from their average value represents, all else
being equal, an increase in $28.17 (0.45 X 62.61) dollars of General Spending per
capita using the Replica (9), while using Replica (6) the increment would only
be of $17.32 (0.3 X 57.76). The level of significance also decreases in all 4 cases,
which means that in the case of General Revenue, the transparency sub-index isn’t
statistically different from zero, within standard levels of confidence.
This exercise gives us confidence that as far as Spending goes, the relationship
found by ALS is preserved by the sub-index, albeit somewhat weakly. Now, the
cross sectional exercises mentioned have used averages of the period spanning 1986
to 1995 on both sides of the equation, with the exception of the transparency indices
that make use of 1995 and 1999 data. It is from these that ALS concluded greater
transparency allows for larger government size, all else remaining equal. However,
these results are inevitably biased. To see why, consider Delaware and Florida from
table 4.1. During 1995, Delaware is far more transparent than Florida, and remains
so since 1989. However, Florida happens to be more transparent than Delaware
during 1987, and if indeed a positive correlation exists between transparency and
government size, the inclusion of 1986 and 1987 data play against this hypothesis if
we assume the effect of transparency becomes manifest during the same year. It is
also possible the relationship found by ALS is an artifact of temporal aggregation,
but this is impossible to detect without temporal data like that of table 4.1.
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The following exercise aims to establish the veracity of this relationship among
American states, using as a measure of transparency, the index formed by the subset
of six budgetary characteristics recorded across time. The exercise will focus on the
span from 1985 to 2002. The data for every variable is annual, excepting some of
the data of the transparency index that had irregular periodicity. The assumption
is that budgetary practices change the year after they are reported, and 1985 was
chosen as the initial year. In this case then, 1985 and 1986 share the same index as
1987, which is a year for which we have reported data; the 1988 index is the same
as the 1989 index; 1990 and 1991 have the same values as 1992, and so forth.
Table 4.4 shows the results obtained from the longitudinal analysis, again split
into four quadrants. The first column of each quadrant shows the results obtained
from pooled OLS, and the second column the results obtained from fixed effects.
Every regression is controlled by time effects, but I have omitted these coefficients
for reasons of space.
By focusing on the pooled OLS columns, we see that the inclusion of the tem-
poral dimension for the 1985-2002 period raises the levels of relevance on the side of
Spending, but remains insignificant to Revenues. In every case, the coefficient asso-
ciated with the transparency index suffers an important reduction in its economic
importance, down to a third of the previous estimate. This confirms the suspicion
of bias in the cross sectional estimates, due to the aggregation of information that
fails to take into account the evolution of transparency. This problem can be ame-
liorated by the inclusion of the dependent variable lagged to the beginning of the
time period under consideration, such as the one used in the previous chapter of
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this thesis.
As far as the control variables are concerned, the real per capita income be-
comes extremely significant and has the expected sign in every case. Unemployment
didn’t play a role in the cross-sectional analysis. On the contrary, it’s a highly rele-
vant variable in all panel treatments. It’s to be expected that this variable represents
a greater per capita expenditure due to a wider unemployment insurance and so-
cial security coverage, as can be seen in every regression. However, it’s thus also
expected that a higher level of unemployment couples to a lower level of per capita
revenues given a smaller taxable base but, as can be seen, all regressions show a
positive and significant relation between unemployment and per capita revenues.
A possible (though admittedly speculative) explanation, is that the level of unem-
ployment is endogenous to the level of per capita income. For example, states with
a high (low) level of per capita income would be net importers (exporters) of un-
employed citizens, which in turn leads to greater rates of unemployment in more
prosperous states. Regardless, this coefficient remains troubling and deserves closer
scrutiny in the near future. The ideology index, computed by Berry et al (1998),
increases as the share of democrats in the state government rises. In other words,
the ideology index increases proportionately to the rate in which the government
swings to the left. A positive coefficient associated with this variable means that
left-leaning governments tend to spend (and collect) more than right-leaning ones.
It can be seen that the importance of the ideology index is reduced by half which
means that this effect is being over-estimated while performing the cross-sectional
estimates reported on table 4.3. Lastly, the proportion of the explained variation is
95
notably increased.
However, it can also be seen that the aggregation of information isn’t the
only source of bias, given that the null hypothesis on the non-existence of fixed
effects can never be rejected. The presence of these state fixed effects, observable
and unobservable, that translate into different per capita levels of revenues and
spending in each state, will be a problem with respect to transparency if they are
correlated with it. In this case, transparency becomes endogenous to those effects
and, therefore, we cannot asses the true influence of transparency on government
spending and revenues. We can think of (a non exhaustive) list of state fixed effects
potentially correlated with transparency: First, the geographical size of the state;
presumably, the smaller the state, it will be easier, not only to corroborate in what
is the government spending, but also to realize what are the true needs of the state,
what is the real level of under provision of public goods. As distance increases,
the effect of transparency becomes weaker. Second, population density ; if more
densely populated areas makes it more likely for the average citizen to vote, and
thus get her preferences represented in the spending share. In this sense, the effect
of transparency should be enhanced as population density increases. Third, income
inequality ; greater inequality will make it more difficult for voters to agree on what
the money should be spent, thus making the transparency effect, other things equal,
less important. Fourth, the level of under provision of public goods ; this is just
what lays underneath the more-transparency-more-revenue hypothesis. If there is
no under provision, then transparency is not expected to render higher levels of
government revenues or spending. Fifth, the degree of government centralization;
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even when this variable is itself endogenous, and possibly even to transparency, it
can be treated as fixed in the short term. More centralization would imply a lower
probability of being represented, so other things equal, lowering the transparency
effect.
Arguably, some of these variables could be collected, but others, like the level
of under provision of public goods, would be very difficult to gather, at least free of
measurement problems. Is for this reason that a FE estimator it is preferred, since
it will wipe out the source of this kind of endogeneity. The fact that not only the
presence of state fixed effects cannot be rejected, but that the estimated parameter
for transparency under OLS and FE are so different indicate us that the endogeneity
problem by using OLS is not negligible. Moreover, Another issue that is relevant
in panel data is the problem of scale anchoring. Each State in every survey had
a different Budget Officer providing the information. Using OLS implies that all
Budget Officers used the same scale to provide the answers across states and in
every moment in time. FE, by the contrary only assumes that that the scale has to
be time-invariant in each state, but allows for variability of the scale across states, so
even when it is not a panacea, it does reduces in one dimension the scaling problem.
Concerning General Spending and Total Spending, we see that the impact
of fiscal transparency over these variables is overestimated as a result of not con-
trolling for fixed effects, since their estimated coefficients by FE drop 27 and 33%,
respectively. It’s interesting to note that the ideology index ceases to be relevant to
General Spending, and flips sign in the case of Total Spending, becoming marginally
relevant even though it’s economic impact is essentially null. This result truly puts
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to the test the popular notion that Republican states are more fiscally conservative.
Concerning Revenues, not controlling by fixed effects has a more dramatic ef-
fect. The transparency index turns out to be irrelevant if estimated by pooled OLS,
but gain statistical significance once fixed effects are taken into account, reaching
levels that are comparable to those obtained for Spending with a very similar eco-
nomic impact.
The cost of using the FE estimator is manifest in the loss of relevance of the
Revenue Limitations variable. By its nature this variable changes at most once per
state over the entire sample. Hence, it is a variable that is highly collinear to the




The set of questions chosen by ALS to construct the transparency index for
the American states is curious when contrasted with the classification given by Alt
and Lassen presented in the previous chapter. In particular, questions 4, 5, 8, and
9 seem to be only tangentially relevant to transparency. Moreover, in the series
of surveys conducted by NASBO, there are three characteristics of the budgetary
process that seem to be more related to fiscal transparency but that were left out
by ALS. These are:
1. Are the agency requests contained in the Executive Budget? (Yes = more
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transparent, since it provides a more informative budget document and a
clearer understanding of the agencies needs).
2. Does the budget document contain justifications of numerical data? (Yes =
more transparent, since it facilitates the analysis of the numbers).
3. Are interim expenditure monitoring reports issued? (Yes = more transparent,
since it should be easier to detect misuse of funds).
Out of the three, a complete record from 1987 to 2002 only exists for the first
two. Using this pair, two additional indices are proposed to evaluate the robustness
of the results presented so far. The first proposal, Transparency 2, simply adds these
two categories to the previous index, i.e.
Transparency2 = Transparency + agency requests + justifications
The second alternative, Transparency3 ignores questions 4 and 5 from the
original index because they are not directly related to transparency, and adds the
two new categories proposed in this section:
Transparency3 = Transparency2 - binding - revenue forecast.
The results of using transparency2 and Transparency3 as measures of fiscal
transparency are presented in tables 4.5 and 4.6, respectively. In general, we see
that the positive relation between transparency and government size is maintained
although it becomes clearer when government size is determined based on Spending
rather than Revenues. The point estimate of transparency is highly sensitive to
which questions are included if it is obtained by OLS, even though these indices
are, necessarily, highly correlated. By the contrary, the effect estimated using FE
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is more stable. Using Transparency3 increases the confidence levels for estimates of
General and Total Spending, but at the same time, the transparency effect on Total
Revenue effect becomes undistinguishable different from zero at conventional levels
of confidence. This asymmetry in the effect of transparency between revenue and
expense becomes more relevant when we take into account the theoretical basis for
the positive relation between transparency and government size stems from the side
of revenues, as was mentioned briefly in the introduction of this chapter. None the
less, the effect remain present in General Revenues, where it should be more readily
apparent since transfers from the Federal Government to the states, which are part
of the Total but not the General Revenue, can dampen the estimated effect.
4.3.2 Is there a Real Effect of Transparency?
The last quadrant of table 4.3 presents the results in terms of real Total Spend-
ing. Given that fiscal transparency is significant, ALS conclude “the effect of trans-
parency does not depend on whether general or total figures are used, or nominal
and constant-price. In short, this result is not the artefact of a particular choice
of concept for size of government.” In fact, it’s no surprise they obtained the same
qualitative results with real than with nominal variables because the correlation
between real and nominal averages is equal to 1. The situation is obviously differ-
ent when the temporal dimension is taken into account. All nominal measures of
government size, even expressed in per capita terms, have been trending upwards in
every state. As mentioned above, although there is great heterogeneity on the evolu-
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tion of transparency across states, taken as a whole they have a u-shaped temporal
evolution, which has been growing steadily since 1990. It is thus possible that the
relation between transparency and government size could be due to a third factor
responsible for both, though it is hard to guess what that factor might be. A form
to lessen this problem is by subtracting from the dependent variables the part of the
growth that corresponds to the change in the price level. As shown below in table
4.7, it’s not so clear that fiscal transparency has an effect on government size when
the size is measured in real terms. Each quadrant of table 4.7 is divided into three
rows, one for every measure of transparency discussed above; the values of control
variables are omitted given that they are not qualitatively altered.
The original transparency index (Transparency) loses its explanatory power on
real variables. In turn, the alternative transparency measures yield a split diagnostic.
On the one hand, they retain their significance to account for Real Spending, which
could be interpreted as a natural consequence of these indices given that they ignore
questions that are only tangentially related to transparency. On the other hand,
these alternative measures of transparency seem to be unrelated to Real Revenues.
This asymmetry in the measures of transparency should be addressed in the future.
4.4 Historical vs. Retrospective measures of Fiscal Transparency:
Common Ground
In this section, I compare the measure of transparency of the American states,
for the period 1985-2002, presented in the previous section, with a new index ob-
101
tained by Alt, Lassen and Rose (ALR) (2006) that corresponds to the period 1972-
2002. As explained by the authors, the ALR index is the temporal extension to the
index obtained by ALS. To do so, they “have collected a unique data set, comprised
of survey responses to a questionnaire sent to budget officers of all fifty states, to
conduct an annual score for each year between 1972 and 2002”.2 In light of the
results presented earlier, it’s clear this data set is not as unique as these authors
presume. There are differences in the methods used to obtain the ALR index and the
index I calculated in the previous section. However, if we focus only on data starting
from 1985, and restrict ourselves exclusively to data from the NASBO surveys, both
indices should be identical assuming no errors in the data.
Every state’s budget officer is responsible for providing information for the
ALR questionnaire. The budget officer is also responsible for providing information
to NASBO publications. A weakness in the ALR survey is that the burden of
providing information for the entire 30 year span of 1972-2002 lies on the budget
officer in charge during the 2005/2006 period. This requires extreme good will on
the part of the current budget officer. On the other hand, the NASBO data sets are
a collection of information provided by every budget officer that has held the charge
as part of their normal duties. I am not inclined to say which of the two data sets is
less prone to error, but as we will see below, there are notable differences between
the two.
Unfortunately, ALR do not report the exact value of their index by state nor
as a function of time as I do in table 4.1. However, one may infer these values from
2Emphasis added
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Figure 4.1: Fiscal Transparency in American States, 1972-2002, accord-































1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000
AK AL AR AZ CA
CO CT DE FL GA
HI IA ID IL IN
KS KY LA MA MD
ME MI MN MO MS
MT NC ND NE NH
NJ NM NV NY OH
OK OR PA RI SC
SD TN TX UT VA










their graphical representation in figure 4.1. with only a small margin of error.
The Differences:
1. ALR report nine states that suffer no change whatsoever in their transparency
index during the period 1972-2002: Arkansas, Hawaii, Maine, North Dakota,
New Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Tennessee. There
are 5 other states that have remained equally transparent since 1987: Alabama,
Connecticut, Indiana, New Jersey and Oklahoma. Using my index, which is
based on only the six characteristics surveyed by the NASBO, I find the only
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two states that have maintained transparency are New Jersey and Michigan,
which gives us only one state in common between both methods. In order
to conciliate the rest, it would be necessary to assume that changes took
place in the three items I am not considering; that these changes had taken
place at exactly the same years, and in such a way that they were of equal
magnitude and opposite sign to the sum of the six remaining items, a highly
unlikely scenario. Moreover, the index computed and plotted by ALR shows
the sum of answers in favor of transparency, divided by the maximum possible
number of affirmative answers for every state in a given year. In those instances
where information became unavailable to ALR, both the numerator and the
denominator were affected, which means changes in their index values could
be the result of information variability, rather than actual changes in the
budgetary process. This is far from a slight problem considering that the
index obtained by ALR was lacking complete information in 15.3% of their
data points.
2. According to ALR there are four episodes during which the level of budgetary
transparency underwent dramatic changes, which they define as periods of up
to five years during which the index grew in at least 3 items: Delaware (1978-
1980), North Carolina (1991-1995), Rhode Island (1990-1991) and Wyoming
(1993-1997), which can be seen in figure 4.1. With this information in hand,
ALR set about the task of establishing what were the important Political
and economical conditions in every state that might account for such abrupt
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changes. Regrettably, the documentation on budgetary transparency is insuf-
ficient given that only one of the three items is reported in each case. Of those
items for which changes are documented, the one relevant to Delaware can-
not be contrasted with the NASBO source because it lies outside the period
spanned by the data set. About the three remaining cases, ALR report that
North Carolina introduced performance measures in the 1991 budget, and sim-
ilar measures were introduced in Wyoming in 1995. The NASBO publications
report the inclusion of performance measures in the budget in both states as
far back as 1989, which once again serves to underscore the patent differences
between the data sets.3 On the flip side, using the ALR methodology with the
data on table 4.1 I find several episodes of dramatic change that are not rep-
resented in ALR: Florida during1987-1989 (3 point decrease), Massachusetts
1992-1995 (3 point increase), Mississippi 1989-1995 (3 point increase over 6
years), New Hampshire 1987-1989 (3 point decrease) and West Virginia (3
point decrease).
3. Regarding the levels of the index, and given the strong persistence this measure
implies, it’s easy to compare the level of transparency among states in 2002.
The correlation between both indices is 0.53 (this is an approximation, given
that I don’t have the exact value of the ALR sample). While this number is
positive, it is still somewhat low when compared to the values corresponding
3The case documented for Rhode Island is the introduction of binding consensus revenue fore-
casting that, as explained earlier, NASBO began reporting from 1992, time at which Rhode Island
has already had incorporated this feature.
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to 1995 that were used in the exercise presented in table 4.3, the values for
Replica (9) versus Replica (6). For that year, the correlation value was 0.71,
which means that something more than the difference between the three items
must be at play here. While there are similarities (Utah is the state with the
highest score in both cases) there are also great differences, such as Wyoming
which has one of the lowest scores in my sample while having one of the
highest scores in ALR’s. Remarkably, this difference is apparently of 5 points
in absolute values, in spite of the fact the largest discrepancy should not exceed
3 points.
We have seen the difference between the two data sets is significant. The
question of how the results presented in the previous section would be affected by
using the ALR set will necessarily remain unanswered. Unfortunately the authors
limited themselves to finding what are the determinants of their own measure of
Fiscal transparency, and fail to report what are the effects of fiscal transparency on
fiscal outcomes, which would have given a natural extension to ALS (2003). Once
again, the option is to look at the flip side and analyze how the ALR results on
the determinants of fiscal transparency may be altered using the index presented
in this chapter. However, this lies beyond the scope of this thesis, and will remain
something to be looked at in the future.
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4.5 What is the connection between the results of Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4?
As mentioned above, the hypothesis that greater government size can be asso-
ciated with greater transparency depends on two assumptions: under-provision of
public goods and a direct benefit resulting from government spending. In fact, low
transparency ought to be the cause of sub-optimal levels of public goods, because
voters are unaware of what the money will be spent on. As transparency increases,
voters will be willing to yield greater resources if they know the money will be spent
in areas where they agree the level of public goods is sub-optimal. This agreement
implies a direct benefit of public goods. The extra dollar of spending is more likely
to bring direct benefits the smaller is the government jurisdiction. In this sense,
it’s likely an increase in transparency at a national level won’t necessarily lead to
an increase in government size because the benefits are diluted among the entire
population.
On the other hand, the hypothesis of the impact of transparency at a local level
has no relevance to deficit, which is expected to be null or perhaps even negative.
The results of chapter 3 are much more about public debt and deficit than they are
about government size (although a few results in that regard are obtained through
levels of expenditure). Table 4.8 shows the results obtained from the model making
use of total deficit and general deficit as the measures of fiscal outcomes. It can
be seen from the table that no relation exists between deficit and any of the three
representations of transparency presented above. A positive relation with total
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deficit is obtained only when the model is estimated using OLS that, once again,
gives sense of the bias that results when the fixed effects of each state are not taken
into account.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I generally corroborate the result reported by Alt, Lassen
and Skilling (2003) that greater fiscal transparency among the American states is
associated with greater levels of government spending. However, this effect seems to
be less robust and economically relevant than these authors claim. On the one hand,
there exists fixed effects that can’t be adequately controlled for in a cross-sectional
setting. When these fixed effects are properly taken into account, the economic effect
of fiscal transparency on government size is reduced to approximately a third of the
ALS prediction. On the other hand, transparency seems to have asymmetric effects
on expense and revenue, and this effect is more notable on the former, rather than
the latter. This is striking given that the theoretical foundation of the result stems
from the revenue side. This asymmetry multiplies when the effect is measured over
real variables, casting further doubt on the true importance of fiscal transparency
on the size of government.
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Table 4.4: Fiscal Transparency and Budgetary Outcomes 1985-2002.
Nominal pc General Spending Nominal pc Total Spending
OLS FE OLS FE
Transparency 23.74 17.28 28.44 18.95
(11.33)∗∗ (7.15)∗∗ (12.82)∗∗ (8.06)∗∗
Real pc Income 0.13 0.52 0.28 0.61
(0.05)∗∗∗ (0.10)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.11)∗∗∗
Unemployment 53.20 33.75 98.19 57.76
(9.40)∗∗∗ (5.41)∗∗∗ (11.11)∗∗∗ (6.08)∗∗∗
Ideology Index 4.73 -0.02 5.00 -.63
(0.65)∗∗∗ (0.34) (0.74)∗∗∗ (0.38)∗
South -414.76 — -488.49 —
(28.12)∗∗∗ — (33.14)∗∗∗ —
Revenue Limitation -63.92 3.65 -30.76 12.03
(33.26)∗∗ (29.20) (39.45) (32.86)
Constant 786.63 167.34 331.33 6.70
(130.62)∗∗∗ (202.10) (154.30)∗∗ (227.49)
R2 0.75 0.96 0.76 0.96
F for ui = 0, Prob > F= — 0.000 — 0.000
Nominal pc General Revenue Nominal pc Total Revenue
OLS FE OLS FE
Transparency 18.80 15.64 6.39 20.54
(13.40) (7.24)∗∗ (15.63) (10.45)∗∗
Real pc Income 0.16 0.52 0.29 0.73
(0.06)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.14)∗∗∗
Unemployment 50.08 17.46 91.24 28.30
(10.54)∗∗∗ (5.47)∗∗∗ (12.80)∗∗∗ (7.89)∗∗∗
Ideology Index 4.87 -0.07 4.75 -1.00
(0.76)∗∗∗ (0.34) (0.89)∗∗∗ (0.50)∗∗
South -444.38 — -577.60 —
(31.21)∗∗∗ — (37.39)∗∗∗ —
Revenue Limitation -106.67 -6.65 -88.18 -8.46
(36.14)∗∗∗ (29.53) (43.31)∗∗ (42.63)
Constant 843.03 371.08 754.85 206.92
(143.82)∗∗∗ (204.42) (166.28)∗∗∗ (295.09)
R2 0.71 0.96 0.75 0.95
F for ui = 0, Prob > F= — 0.000 — 0.000
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.∗∗∗ significant at 1%, ∗∗ significant at 5% and,
∗ significant at 10%.
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Table 4.5: Fiscal Transparency2 and Budgetary Outcomes 1985-2002.
Nominal pc General Spending Nominal pc Total Spending
OLS FE OLS FE
Transparency2 23.17 16.97 26.42 20.16
( 8.90)∗∗∗ (5.95)∗∗∗ (9.98)∗∗∗ (6.70)∗∗
Real pc Income 0.14 0.51 0.30 0061
(0.049)∗∗∗ (0.10)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.11)∗∗∗
Unemployment 53.82 34.15 98.96 58.32
(9.37)∗∗∗ (5.40)∗∗∗ (11.11)∗∗∗ (6.08)∗∗∗
Ideology Index 4.69 -0.04 4.95 -0.66
(0.65)∗∗∗ (0.34) ().73)∗∗∗ (0.38)∗
South -412.60 — -485.93 —
(28.51)∗∗∗ — (33.48)∗∗∗ —
Revenue Limitation -62.81 3.38 -29.30 12.68
(33.47)∗ (29.04) (39.73) (32.66)
Constant 731.70 146.21 269.38 -21.91
(136.03)∗∗∗ (202.21) (160.86)∗ (227.40)
R2 0.75 0.96 0.76 0.96
F for ui = 0, Prob > F= — 0.000 — 0.000
Nominal pc General Revenue Nominal pc Total Revenue
OLS FE OLS FE
Transparency2 24.89 14.51 18.58 20.20
(10.63)∗∗ (6.03)∗∗ (12.30) (8.70)∗∗
Real pc Income 0.16 0.52 0.28 0.73
(0.05)∗∗∗ (0.10)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.14)∗∗∗
Unemployment 50.41 17.76 91.12 28.79
(10.48)∗∗∗ (5.47)∗∗∗ (12.81)∗∗∗ (7.89)∗∗∗
Ideology Index 4.85 -0.09 4.76 -1.04
(0.74)∗∗∗ (0.34) (0.88)∗∗∗ (0.50)∗∗
South -442.52 — -576.74 —
(31.70)∗∗∗ — (37.89)∗∗∗ —
Revenue Limitation -106.47 -7.42 -89.17 -8.76
(36.36)∗∗∗ (29.40) (43.67)∗∗ (42.43)
Constant 780.59 354.94 704.33 181.68
(149.58)∗∗∗ (204.71) (173.86)∗∗∗ (295.41)
R2 0.71 0.85 0.75 0.95
F for ui = 0, Prob > F= — 0.000 — 0.000
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.∗∗∗ significant at 1%, ∗∗ significant at 5% and,
∗ significant at 10%.
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Table 4.6: Fiscal Transparency3 and Budgetary Outcomes 1985-2002.
Nominal pc General Spending Nominal pc Total Spending
OLS FE OLS FE
Transparency3 30.54 19.57 31.59 24.75
(11.72)∗∗∗ (7.01)∗∗∗ (13.19)∗∗ (7.87)∗∗∗
Real pc Income 0.16 0.52 0.32 0.61
(0.05)∗∗∗ (0.10)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.11)∗∗∗
Unemployment 52.40 34.06 97.56 58.31
(9.46)∗∗∗ (5.40)∗∗ (11.15)∗∗∗ (6.07)∗∗∗
Ideology Index 4.76 0.04 5.02 -0.55
(0.64)∗∗∗ (0.34) (0.73)∗∗ (0.38)
South -407.19 — -480.40 —
(28.73)∗∗∗ — (33.57)∗∗∗ —
Revenue Limitation -68.89 -1.87 -35.33 6.83
(33.64)∗∗ (28.88) (39.97) (32.45)
Constant 705.12 139.80 249.01 -34.58
(138.21)∗∗∗ (202.55) (163.10) (227.59)
R2 0.75 0.96 0.76 0.96
F for ui = 0, Prob > F= — 0.000 — 0.000
Nominal pc General Revenue Nominal pc Total Revenue
OLS FE OLS FE
Transparency3 34.91 14.33 27.32 15.62
(13.87)∗∗ (7.10)∗∗ (15.97)∗ (10.26)
Real pc Income 0.18 0.52 0.29 0.74
(0.05)∗∗∗ (0.10)∗∗∗ (0.06)∗∗∗ (0.14)∗∗∗
Unemployment 48.76 17.54 89.81 28.22
(10.60)∗∗∗ (5.47)∗∗∗ (12.86)∗∗∗ (7.91)∗∗
Ideology Index 4.93 -0.03 4.83 -0.965
(0.74)∗∗∗ (.35) (0.88)∗∗∗ (0.50)∗
South -436.31 — -571.86 —
( 31.91)∗∗∗ — (38.16)∗∗∗ —
Revenue Limitation -113.59 -12.53 -94.82 -17.00
(37.03)∗∗∗ (29.27) (44.02)∗∗ (42.28)
Constant 745.62 357.57 674.39 199.92
(152.76)∗∗∗ (205.28)∗ ( 177.00)∗∗∗ ( 296.54)
R2 0.71 0.96 0.75 0.95
F for ui = 0, Prob > F= — 0.000 — 0.000
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.∗∗∗ significant at 1%, ∗∗ significant at 5% and,
∗ significant at 10%.
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Table 4.7: Fiscal Transparency and Real Budgetary Outcomes 1985-2002.
Real pc General Spending Real pc Total Spending
OLS FE OLS FE
Transparency 21.64 7.78 27.15 9.95
(12.77)∗ (7.20) (14.44)∗ (7.89)
Transparency2 22.49 10.52 26.12 13.79
(9.76)∗∗ (5.99)∗ (10.96)∗∗ (6.56)∗∗
Transparency3 31.14 14.36 32.07 19.12
(12.85)∗∗ (7.04)∗∗ (14.44)∗∗ (7.71)∗∗
Real pc General Revenue Real pc Total Revenue
OLS FE OLS FE
Transparency 16.52 7.40 3.19 13.44
(15.17) (6.96) (17.58) (10.08)
Transparency2 24.33 9.05 17.24 14.87
(11.62)∗∗ (5.80) (13.41) (8.38)∗
Transparency3 35.78 9.31 27.71 9.23
(15.22)∗∗ (6.83) (17.41) (9.88)
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.∗∗∗ significant at 1%, ∗∗ significant at 5% and,
∗ significant at 10%.
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Table 4.8: Fiscal Transparency and Deficits 1985-2002.
Fiscal Transparency and Deficits 1985-2002
General pc Deficit Total pc Deficit
OLS FE OLS FE
Transparency 4.93 1.64 22.05 -1.59
(4.41) (5.30) (6.71)∗∗∗ (8.66)
Real pc Income -0.02 -0.01 0.002 -0.12
(0.02) (0.07) (0.028) (0.12)
Unemployment 3.12 16.28 6.96 29.46
(3.03) (4.01)∗∗∗ (4.72) (6.54)∗∗∗
Ideology Index -0.14 0.05 0.25 0.37
(0.25) (0.25) (0.40) (0.41)
South 29.61 — 89.10 —
(9.84)∗∗∗ — (15.30)∗∗∗ —
Revenue Limitation 42.75 10.31 57.41 20.49
(11.24)∗∗∗ (21.64) (17.33)∗∗∗ (35.32)
Constant -56.40 -203.74 -423.51 -200.21
(50.01) (149.81) (71.48)∗∗∗ (244.47)
R2 0.12 0.16 0.38 0.50
F for ui = 0, Prob > F= — 0.000 — 0.000
General pc Deficit Total pc Deficit
OLS FE OLS FE
Transparency2 -1.72 2.46 7.84 -0.05
(3.50) (4.42) (5.18) (7.21)
Transparency3 -4.37 5.24 4.28 9.12
(4.20) (5.20) (6.30) (8.48)
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.∗∗∗ significant at 1%, ∗∗ significant at 5% and,




In a simple model in which voters can coordinate perfectly to demand results
from the policymaker in charge of the government (who typically will enjoy an
informational advantage about the true actions taken in the production of public
goods), the model shows the best way to curtail his unproductive activities and
curb a tendency to incur in greater debt is by reducing the informational advantage
directly. That is, by increasing the level of transparency of the whole budgetary
process. On the contrary, if voter’s strategy is to impose numeric constraints over
imperfectly observed fiscal outcomes, these will have the desired effect only if the
level of transparency is sufficiently high. When transparency is non-existent, the
imposition of a numeric constraint will in fact carry the contrary effect, that is,
higher average debt and lower expected welfare.
I use a new survey on budgetary practices, with the broadest country coverage
so far, to construct several measures of the different budgetary institutions recog-
nized in the literature: numerical constraints, procedural rules, and transparency.
The results for the whole sample of countries indicate that not all budgetary
institutions affect fiscal outcomes in the same manner. In particular, only the level of
transparency shows a significant and economically important effect on Central and
General Deficits, as well as on General Debt. On the contrary, numerical constraints
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and procedural rules fail to show any significant effect on fiscal outcomes. These
results, however, are not independent of the country’s level of economic development.
In particular, the results hold for the richest countries but none of the budgetary
institutions enters significantly for less developed economies.
To the question of perfect substitutability between different components of
the budgetary process, I provide evidence that the constructed indexes are very
sensitive to the information included. This suggests that the results obtained here
and elsewhere should be taken as preliminary until we have a better way to define
these institutions.
Finally, contrary to what was postulated in the previous chapter, for this sam-
ple of countries it does not seem to exist an interaction effect between transparency
and numerical constraints.
Lastly, I generally corroborate the result reported by Alt, Lassen and Skilling
(2003) that greater fiscal transparency among the American states is associated with
greater levels of government spending. However, this effect seems to be less robust
and sizable than these authors claim. On the one hand, there exists fixed effects
that can’t be adequately controlled for in a cross-sectional setting. When these fixed
effects are properly taken into account, the economic effect of fiscal transparency on
government size is reduced to approximately a third of the ALS estimation. On the
other hand, transparency seems to have asymmetric effects on expense and revenue,
and this effect is more notable on the former, rather than the latter. This is striking
given that the theoretical foundation of the result stems from the revenue side. This
asymmetry multiplies when the effect is measured over real variables, casting further
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doubt on the true importance of fiscal transparency on the size of government.
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Appendix A
Probabilities of Shock on Signal for Different Transparency
Figure A.1: Co-movement of θ and θ̃ conditional on ε.
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Appendix B
Index Substitutability for Numerical and Procedural Rules
Table B.1: Different Numerical Constraint Indexes on Gross Debt.
Number of Questions 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Combinations 55 165 330 462 462 330 165 55 11 1
% cases (-) sig. 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
% cases (+) 91 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
% cases (+) sig. 9 4 6 6 5 3 2 00 00 00
Table B.2: Different Hierarchical Indexes on Gross Debt.
Number of Questions 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Combinations 45 120 210 252 210 120 45 10 1
% cases (-) sig. 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
% cases (+) 64 62 67 67 71 76 81 100 100
% cases (+) sig. 5 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table B.3: Different Numerical Constraint Indexes on General Balance.
Number of Questions 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Combinations 55 165 330 462 462 330 165 55 11 1
% cases (+) sig. 7 8 6 4 2 0 0 0 0 0
% cases (-) 17 10 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
% cases (-) sig. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table B.4: Different Hierarchical Indexes on General Balance.
Number of Questions 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Combinations 45 120 210 252 210 120 45 10 1
% cases (+) sig. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
% cases (-) 30 32 32 29 24 14 7 0 0
% cases (-) sig. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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